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INTRODUCTION
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines1 (2010 HMG) establish the
current basis by which the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice evaluate horizontal mergers, which are
mergers of competitors or acquisitions of one competitor by another.2

1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7GS9-9HAR] [hereinafter 2010 HMG].
2 Simply put, a horizontal merger combines two current or potential competitors, which is to
say ﬁrms that are operating in the same product market, such as two ﬁrms that sell Pay TV services
to consumers. “Vertical mergers combine ﬁrms or assets that operate at diﬀerent stages of the same
supply chain.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, DRAFT VERTICAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 1 n.2 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles/documents/public_statements/
1561715/p810034verticalmergerguidelinesdraft.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLT5-HD8A] [hereinafter
2020 Draft Vertical Guidelines]. So, for example, the AT&T/Time Warner Entertainment merger,
which the Department of Justice failed to persuade a federal court to block, is a vertical merger
because it combined the seller of Pay TV services (DirecTV) with the creator of content that was
included in the Pay TV service. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(decision aﬃrming the district court’s denial of a permanent injunction of the “proposed vertical
merger of a programmer and a distributor in the same industry”). Vertical (or to be more speciﬁc,
nonhorizontal) mergers are beyond the scope of this Article, although they do raise important
questions about the treatment of eﬃciencies. See Xavier Becerra et al., Public Comments of 28 State
Attorneys General on Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, 17-23 (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles/attachments/798-draft-vertical-merger-guidelines/state_ags_ﬁnal_
vmg_comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE8D-29NQ].
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Although they are not binding on courts, the Guidelines have been relied
upon by courts reviewing horizontal mergers.3
The Guidelines establish a taxonomy for analysis that has become familiar
to antitrust economists and attorneys, for example, defining product and
geographic markets, calculating market shares, considering unilateral and
coordinated effects, and then, importantly, looking to outcomes that could defeat
any possible anticompetitive effects, very notably the existence of efficiencies.4
Here is a stylized example of the role that eﬃciencies might play in an
antitrust review. Imagine two paper manufacturers, each with a single factory
that produces several kinds of paper, and suppose their marginal costs decline
with longer production runs of a single type of paper. They wish to merge,
which by deﬁnition eliminates a competitor. They justify the merger on the
ground that after they combine their operations, they will increase the
specialization in each plant, enabling longer runs and lower marginal costs,
and thus incentivizing them to lower prices to their customers and expand
output. If the cost reduction were suﬃciently large, such eﬃciencies could
oﬀset the merger’s otherwise expected tendency to increase prices.5
Under the 2010 HMG, the agencies will not challenge a merger if the
cognizable eﬃciencies—that is, “merger-speciﬁc eﬃciencies that have been
veriﬁed and do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or
service”—are suﬃcient to ensure the merger “is not likely to be

3 See, e.g., United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 n. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Although
the Guidelines are not binding, the D.C. Circuit and other courts have looked to them for guidance
in previous merger cases.”); United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F. 3d 345, 356-60 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(citing the guidelines to evaluate the parties’ arguments about eﬃciencies); United States v. CVS
Health Corp., 407 F. Supp. 3d 45, 55 (D.D.C. 2019) (observing that the disputed “market is
‘moderately,’ as opposed to ‘highly,’ concentrated under the Government’s guidelines”).
4 Following Hovenkamp infra note 51, we use the term “eﬃciencies” to refer to the class of
outcomes that include resource savings and lower unit costs that may oﬀset competitive harms. A
broader term might be “competitive beneﬁts” but we use the term “eﬃciencies” because the agencies
and courts employ the terminology. Cost reductions that result from pecuniary savings, which are
transfers rather than eﬃciencies, or from merger-speciﬁc increases in market power, which are
further competitive harm, are not eﬃciencies. These concepts are discussed further below.
Eﬃciencies are not the only factor that can blunt the potential anticompetitive harm of a merger;
for example, entry of new ﬁrms may prevent the merged ﬁrm from exercising market power. See
2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 27-29. For the purposes of this discussion, we posit a proposed horizontal
merger in which the only basis used to contest the threat of harm is the claim of eﬃciencies. That is
a simpliﬁcation; courts can rely on eﬃciencies alongside other contentions. See e.g., New York v.
Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-05434-VM-RWL, slip op. at 57 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2020) (“The
trend among lower courts has thus been to recognize or at least assume that evidence of eﬃciencies
may rebut the presumption that a merger’s eﬀects will be anticompetitive, even if such evidence
could not be used as a defense to an actually anticompetitive merger.”).
5 The hypothetical is not, of course, comprehensive; it does not consider, for example, their
market shares, whether the relevant market is highly concentrated, or whether entry barriers exist.
Id.; infra notes 96, 126.
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anticompetitive in any relevant market.”6 Thus, when the concern is that the
merged company would unilaterally raise prices, eﬃciencies must be
suﬃcient to oﬀset all upward pricing pressure from the loss of a competitor.7
The focus is on outcomes that improve competition, for example, a reduction
in the resources needed to produce a given output, lowering per-unit costs.8
In this Article, we concentrate on two separate phases of antitrust
enforcement. The first, and less studied, concerns the process by which the
federal antitrust agencies decide whether to launch a full-blown investigation of
a proposed merger: a so-called “Second Request.”9 Only a small fraction of
proposed mergers receive such attention, but the agencies challenge a substantial
portion of horizontal mergers that are fully investigated and have a high success
rate when challenging horizontal mergers in court.10 The dichotomy in outcomes
between the bulk of mergers that receive relatively quick approval and those few
that are subject to a full-blown investigation is stark.
We examine two questions: First, are the federal antitrust agencies underinvestigating mergers? We believe the likely answer to this question is “yes.”
The federal antitrust agencies appear to rely on an approach that gives too
much implicit weight to the existence of eﬃciencies in their decisions
whether to investigate mergers even though the agencies do not conduct an
individualized analysis of eﬃciencies for the vast majority of mergers that do
not result in a full-ﬂedged investigation, because they lack the detailed
information at that stage in the process to do so. We describe below the
existence of what we call a “standard eﬃciency credit,” which is to say a
6 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 30. The analysis of eﬃciencies in the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines is essentially the same as that ﬁrst established by the 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
7 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 30-31 (“[T]he Agencies consider whether cognizable eﬃciencies
likely would be suﬃcient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market,
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”).
8 See C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 2078, 20812 (2018) (“Input price reductions from a merger that reﬂect real resource savings present a potential
source of eﬃciencies.”); see also infra Part III.
9 As we explain below, parties proposing mergers and acquisitions that meet certain ﬁnancial
thresholds must notify the federal antitrust agencies of their intent to consummate their transactions
and provide information on the transaction and potential competitive overlaps, thus triggering the
opportunity for agency review. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. Merger investigations
typically proceed in two phases: the opening of a preliminary investigation during the ﬁrst thirty
days following a Hart–Scott–Rodino (HSR) ﬁling (sometimes called “Phase I”), which allows the
agency to make an initial determination of whether a more in depth-examination is needed to
determine potential competitive harm; and a much more intensive second investigatory phase
initiated by an agency’s “Second Request” for information. For simplicity, our deﬁnition of full
investigations excludes those closed before issuing a Second Request. Merger Review, FED. TRADE
COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-and-competition/mergerreview [https://perma.cc/5BGG-AAKJ] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).
10 See infra Part IV.
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generalized belief in the existence of at least modest and ubiquitous
eﬃciencies, which we argue below is likely overstated but has the eﬀect of
justifying market-concentration thresholds that are therefore likely to be too
lax.11 Second, are the burdens placed on parties to demonstrate assertions of
eﬃciencies too high? We believe that the answer to this question is “no,” and
critics are not justiﬁed in asserting that the federal antitrust agencies and
reviewing courts demand too much of merging parties when the existence of
claimed eﬃciencies are reviewed in an individual transaction.
Our answers to these questions are informed by our analysis of the
economic literature, which concludes that a substantial body of work casts
doubt on the presumptive existence, magnitude, and importance of efficiencies
in horizontal mergers.12 That challenges the revisionist Chicago School
approach, exemplified by Robert Bork,13 which holds that horizontal mergers
inevitably produce merger-specific efficiencies. Acceptance of the Chicago
School assertion of ubiquitous efficiencies by antitrust practitioners and
enforcement agencies has been a change with significant long-lasting effects.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview of the
treatment of efficiencies in horizontal merger policy, both in terms of historical
development and current practice. Part II discusses what should properly be
considered an efficiency—a designation that we believe includes true resource
savings but not the use of newly-acquired market power—and draws
conclusions from the economic literature on the existence and magnitude of
such efficiencies. Part III considers the factors that go into deciding whether to
launch a full-fledged investigation,14 and concludes that belief in the
generalized existence of efficiencies has led to the application of market
concentration standards that are likely too lax and that should be reviewed. Part
11 See e.g., Michael Salinger, Dir., Bureau of Econ., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Four Questions about
Horizontal Merger Enforcement 3 (Sept. 14, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/
documents/public_statements/four-questions-about-horizontal-merger-enforcement/050914ababro
wnbag.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3CR-QZPW] (“If, however, we are unable to assess eﬃciencies on a
case-by-case basis, then I see no alternative to treating the cost of a ‘false block’ as being the average
improvement in eﬃciency, an approach I refer to as the ‘standard deduction’ approach to merger
eﬃciencies.”); Louis Kaplow, Eﬃciencies in Merger Analysis 43-56 (April 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on ﬁle with the authors) (discussing and identifying literature concerning the origins
of “an eﬃciency credit, akin to the standard deduction in the U.S. individual income tax”); see also
infra Section II.B, notes 136–37 and accompanying text. It is important to recognize that resource
constraints also may have contributed signiﬁcantly to narrowing the horizontal merger enforcement
aperture. MICHAEL KADES, WASHINGTON CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, THE STATE OF U.S.
FEDERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 17-18 (2019) (reporting the decline in DOJ and FTC
budgets in real terms over the past two decades).
12 See infra Part III.
13 ROBERT H. BORK, Horizontal Mergers, in THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 217 (1978).
14 See infra Part III and note 115 (noting resource limitations and the importance of additional
antitrust resources).
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IV reviews criticisms of the federal antitrust agencies’ treatment of efficiencies
when investigating or challenging a merger in court and finds that, given
current economic understandings, they are not well-founded.
I. THE RISE OF EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND INCREASED THRESHOLDS
FOR MARKET CONCENTRATION: THE IMPLICIT STANDARD
EFFICIENCY CREDIT
Since the issuance of the first merger guidelines in 1968, the antitrust
agencies have changed their approaches to (i) the existence and treatment of
efficiencies and (ii) the use of market concentration analysis to identify mergers
that may be presumed to be likely to harm competition. The co-evolution of
these has reinforced a tendency toward leniency: over time, the accommodation
of efficiencies has expanded and market concentration thresholds identifying
problematic mergers have risen. One can conceive of these as linked through
the implicit use of what we call a standard efficiency credit; a generalized
assumption that horizontal mergers typically generate a level of efficiencies
that could offset modest increases in market power. While this credit is neither
explicit nor applied directly in individual cases, its implied presence has likely
contributed to the increase in the level of market concentration measures that
are deemed to trigger the so-called structural presumption.15 Such marketconcentration measures define the circumstances in which, based on the impact
of a merger on market concentration alone, the government can establish a
prima facie case of anticompetitive harm without the need for additional
evidence (which is to say they establish the structural presumption).16 Thus, if
the working assumption about the ubiquity and magnitude of efficiencies is
wrong, the agencies may be applying their presumption of harm too narrowly.
In this Part, we review the evolution of the antitrust agencies’ approach as
expressed through the merger guidelines. Beginning in 1968, the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice itself offered instruction on the manner
in which it would analyze horizontal mergers; in 1992, and since, the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines have been issued jointly by the Federal Trade Commission
and the Antitrust Division.17 Over time, the treatment of efficiencies became
more generous, the economic perspective favoring their acceptance became
widely-accepted, and the level of market concentration that signals
presumptive harm increased, as summarized in Table 1 and described below.

See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 29 and 125 and accompanying text.
For a history of the evolution of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines as they deal with
eﬃciencies, see William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of
Eﬃciencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 213 (2003).
15
16
17
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Table 1: Treatment of Eﬃciencies and Market Concentration Thresholds in
Merger Guidelines
Merger
Guidelines
1968 Merger
Guidelines
(MG),
Department
of Justice
(DOJ)

1982 MG
DOJ

Treatment of Eﬃciencies
“Unless there are exceptional
circumstances, the
Department will not accept
as a justiﬁcation for
a[ horizontal] acquisition . . .
the claim that the merger
will produce economies (i.e.,
improvements in
eﬃciency).”18

“Except in extraordinary
cases, the Department will
not consider a claim of
speciﬁc eﬃciencies as a
mitigating factor . . . .”20

Market Concentration
Measures for Highly
Concentrated Markets
“In a market in which the
shares of the four largest
firms amount to
approximately 75% or
more, the Department will
ordinarily challenge
mergers” that would
include the combination of
a firm with 4% market
share acquiring another
firm with a market share of
4% or more.19
Defined a highly
concentrated market as
having an Hirschman
Herfindahl Index (HHI)
above 1800; the DOJ is
likely to challenge mergers
resulting in HHIs above
1800 that produce an
increase in the HHI of 100
points or more.21

18 U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
JUSTICE,
1968
MERGER
GUIDELINES
8
(1968),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [https://perma.cc/M68JFBP6] [hereinafter 1968 MG].
19 Id. at 6.
20 U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
1982
MERGER
GUIDELINES
29
(1982)
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CYTLQTJ] [hereinafter 1982 MG].
21 Id. at 13-15. In the 1982 MG, the DOJ notes that an HHI of 1800 corresponds roughly to a
four-ﬁrm concentration ratio of 70%. Id. at 13. The 1968 DOJ guidelines focused on a four-ﬁrm ratio
of 75%. 1968 MG, supra note 18, at 6. The DOJ points out that the 100-point increase in the HHI
would not be triggered by the acquisition of a ﬁrm with less than 7% market share by a ﬁrm with a
less than 7% market share, 1982 MG, supra note 20, at 14 n.31, a larger merger than the 4%/4% merger
that would have triggered a challenge under the 1968 MG. 1968 MG, supra note 18, at 6.
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1984
MG DOJ

“The primary benefit of
mergers to the economy is
their efficiency-enhancing
potential”; “If the parties to
the merger establish by clear
and convincing evidence that
a merger will achieve such
[net] efficiencies, the
Department will consider
those efficiencies in deciding
whether to challenge the
merger.”22

Except in extraordinary
cases, the Department will
challenge a merger where
the HHI increase exceeds
100 and the post-merger
HHI substantially exceeds
1800.23

1992
HMG DOJ
and FTC

The “clear and convincing”
standard is dropped. “The
expected net efficiencies must
be greater the more
significant are the competitive
risks identified” and “[t]he
burden with respect to
efficiency and failure
continues to reside with the
proponents of the merger.”24

“Where the post-merger
HHI exceeds 1800, it will
be presumed that mergers
producing an increase in
the HHI of more than 100
points are likely to create
or enhance market power
or facilitate its exercise.”25

1997
HMG DOJ
Revision

Revision to 1992 joint DOJFTC Horizontal Merger
Guidelines incorporating new
Section 4 on efficiencies, to
clarify how the agencies
analyze efficiency claims. The
current test of cognizability is
promulgated.

Maintains 1992
concentration tests.

22 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, 15,
23 (1984),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NRTJZ2V] [hereinafter 1984 MG].
23 Id.
24 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, 2 n.5, 28 (1992),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11250.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XYF6Y69] [hereinafter 1992 HMG].
25 Id. at 15-16.
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“Mergers resulting in
highly concentrated
markets [HHI above 2500]
that involve an increase in
the HHI of more than 200
points will be presumed to
be likely to enhance
market power.”26 This is
the most generous market
concentration measure that
the Agencies have
employed.

A. 1968-1978: Early Merger Guidelines, Williamson & Bork
The ﬁrst Merger Guidelines were issued by the Department of Justice in
1968 (1968 MG).27 They are notable in three respects. First, they take a very
dim view of an eﬃciencies defense, consistent with the prevailing view of the
courts at the time: “Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the
Department will not accept as a justiﬁcation for an acquisition normally
subject to challenge under its horizontal merger standards the claim that the
merger will produce economies.”28
Second, they established the forerunner of the current structural
presumption, reﬂecting the Supreme Court’s decision ﬁve years earlier in
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, in which it used a measure of
market concentration to construct a presumption of harm.29 Using the fourﬁrm market concentration measure that was standard before the introduction
of the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl Index (HHI) analysis,30 the guidelines
explained that “[i]n a market in which the shares of the four largest ﬁrms
amount to 75% or more, the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers”
that would include, for example, the combination of a ﬁrm with 4% market
share acquiring another ﬁrm with a market share of 4% or more.31

2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 19.
1968 MG, supra note 18.
Id. at 8.
See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963) (referring to “a merger
which produces a ﬁrm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market [that] results in
a signiﬁcant increase in the concentration of ﬁrms in that market”).
30 See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
31 1968 MG, supra note 18, at 6.
26
27
28
29
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Third, the 1968 guidelines connect the view of eﬃciencies with the market
concentration analysis. The guidelines explained that the relevant range for
economies of scale was likely below the level that would produce challenges,
in other words, that the presumption of harm was suﬃciently relaxed to
accommodate those eﬃciencies that might exist.32
The academic and policy debate over merger eﬃciencies was transformed
by a second event in 1968: publication of Oliver Williamson’s theoretical
model illuminating a tension that could occur when mergers increased both
market power and cost savings.33 Williamson described the “welfare tradeoﬀs” between productive eﬃciency gains and consumer losses, illustrated in
Figure 1 below.34 Importantly, Williamson focuses on “total welfare,” an
economic term for the sum of producer (ﬁrms) and consumer (buyers)
surpluses, rather than analyzing the merger’s impact only on consumers of
the ﬁrms’ products.35
Figure 1: Williamson’s Welfare Tradeoﬀs36

Id. at 8.
Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Oﬀs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18, 21 (1968). Williamson came to the topic when, as an economist in the Antitrust
Division, he was tasked by then-Assistant Attorney General Donald Turner to explore the topic in
advance of the issuance of the 1968 merger guidelines. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 17, at 7.
34 Williamson, supra note 33, at 21.
35 Williamson’s analysis applies to a merger of competing sellers, so the focus is on buyers of
the product. A merger of competing buyers could induce an analogous but upstream anticompetitive
harm, in that case to suppliers to the merging ﬁrms. For a discussion of buy-side mergers, see
Hemphill & Rose, supra note 8, at 2082-92. For a discussion of total welfare, see also infra note 72.
36 Williamson, supra note 33, at 21.
32
33
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In what he labels a “naïve tradeoﬀ”37 analysis, Williamson begins with an
industry equilibrium with price P1 equal to average costs AC1, as illustrated
above. Though he does not mention marginal cost in his article, both Figure
1 and the analysis implicitly assume perfect competition pre-merger—that is,
that price is equal to marginal costs, and both are equal to average costs of
AC1.38 He then considers a merger that would increase market power and
raise price to P2, while simultaneously creating eﬃciencies that reduce costs
to AC2. Williamson’s Figure 1 shows that the deadweight loss to consumers
who no longer purchase a product (the triangular cross-hatched area A1) may
be oﬀset by the gain from cost savings that accrue to the ﬁrms (the rectangular
cross-hatched area A2). When A2 is larger than A1, the net impact on total
welfare is positive.
Williamson argued that an eﬃciency gain would not have to be very large
to outweigh consumer harm: “since a relatively large percentage increase in
price is usually required to oﬀset the beneﬁts that result from a 5 to 10 percent
reduction in average costs, the existence of economies of this magnitude is
suﬃciently important to give the antitrust authorities pause before
disallowing such a merger.”39 His argument is critically dependent on a set of
implicit assumptions, importantly including that the ﬁrms have no market
power pre-merger; if there were prior market power, there would be
additional harm from the merger not shown in his diagram.40 Moreover,
Williamson’s naïve tradeoﬀ analysis is indiﬀerent as to whether any of the
eﬃciencies ﬂow to consumers—they may all be captured by the merged ﬁrm
through higher proﬁts, as in his example. Further, losses to consumers who
continue to buy the product, but at a higher price, are not considered as a
competitive harm, but “merely” a transfer from consumers to producers.41

37 Id. at 24-32 (noting the naïve nature of the partial equilibrium analysis and describing myriad
considerations that could alter its conclusions, including general equilibrium eﬀects, inference and
enforcement expenses, delayed timing, incipiency, price increases by competitors of the merging
ﬁrms in response to the merger, income distribution concerns, concentration of political power,
impact on innovation, and managerial slack). Subsequent commentators have noted other
qualiﬁcations that limit or reverse the inferences that Williamson draws. See, e.g., infra note40.
38 Williamson, supra note 33, at 21-23. While Williamson refers only to average costs in his article,
the shaded areas in Figure 1 and comparisons of the magnitudes of efficiency gains to deadweight losses
are correct only when marginal cost is equal to average cost; that is, for perfect competition under a
constant returns to scale production technology. If the initial price is above marginal cost, the
deadweight loss from further market power would be greater than in this figure. See infra note 40.
39 Williamson, supra note 33, at 34.
40 See supra Figure 1; MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 60-62
(2006) (arguing that proponents of Williamson’s argument frequently fail to appreciate the dependence
of this relative welfare comparison on a number of assumptions that may not be met. If firms have market
power even prior to the merger, for example, the incremental harm from increased market power makes
the merger more likely to reduce total welfare for any given level of cost efficiencies).
41 Williamson, supra note 33, at 28.
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Williamson’s emphasis on total welfare was embraced but relabeled by
Robert Bork in The Antitrust Paradox.42 While Bork argues he is applying a
“consumer welfare” standard, this is belied by his claim that “consumers have
lost . . . the area labeled A1—-and have gained in resource savings an amount
equal to the area A2,” which represents “merely a shift of income between two
classes of consumers.”43 Two classes exist, in Bork’s argument, because the
owners of the merged company are themselves consumers and their gains thus
ﬁt within the scope of consumer welfare. This terminology is inconsistent
with both the economic nomenclature and common understanding of
consumer welfare, and at direct odds with Williamson, who highlights the
redistribution from consumers to ﬁrms. Indeed, Bork ignores this and more
than eight pages of qualiﬁcations that Williamson lays out as possible
objections to the conclusions of his “naïve tradeoﬀ ” model. But, as we will
see, Bork’s argument continues to inﬂuence the debate over the “beneﬁts”
that merger authorities should recognize.44
Bork made a second fundamental point—one that diverged from
Williamson’s focus on the measurement of total welfare eﬀects and remains
important today. Bork believed that it is not necessary, or indeed possible, to
calculate individual eﬃciencies at all; rather, they should be presumed to
exist.45 In other words, “[e]conomic analysis does away with the need to
measure eﬃciencies directly. It is enough to know in what sorts of
transactions eﬃciencies are likely to be present and in what sorts
anticompetitive eﬀects are likely to be present.”46 Bork speciﬁcally suggested
that market shares could be used as a means of screening merger eﬃciencies,
foreshadowing the current approach, which has been traced back to the
Chicago School’s skepticism of the ability of antitrust enforcers and courts to
calculate eﬃciencies in individual cases.47

42 BORK, supra note 13, at 107-12; see also Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing
the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1843, 1876 (“Bork adopted [the Williamson]
model in the late 1970s, but renamed it ‘consumer welfare.’”).
43 BORK, supra note 13, at 108-10.
44 See Part IV, infra.
45 BORK, supra note 13, at 124-29; see also Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 42, at 1875
(“Bork as well as Posner believed that eﬃciencies could not be measured in speciﬁc antitrust cases
but must be presumed.”).
46 Williamson, supra note 33, at 20 (quoting Robert H. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 401, 411 (1965)). See generally Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense under Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 417, 429 n.203 (1980) (noting that Bork contended that
requiring an efficiency justification was unwarranted and reviewing the application of Bork’s approach).
47 See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 17, at 16 (discussing the 1982 Merger Guidelines); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976) (stating that individual
eﬃciencies need not be calculated).
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B. 1982-2010: Greater Recognition of Eﬃciencies and Higher Thresholds for
Market Concentration
The 1982 MG introduced the use of Hirschman Herﬁndahl Index (HHI)
as a measure of market concentration and recast the circumstances in which
harm would be presumed.48 Here, and until the promulgation of the 2010
HMG, harm would be presumed where a merger increased HHI by 100
points or more and resulted in a market with an HHI above 1800.49 The 1982
MG expressed skepticism about the existence of eﬃciencies,50 but the new
market concentration approach, which was less strict than its 1968
predecessor, appears consistent with the notion that “the substantive
standards of illegality already assumed and accounted for merger
eﬃciencies.”51 Thus, “a real sympathy to eﬃciencies is built into the
Guidelines from the start.”52
The more dramatic departure from earlier positions came when the 1984
Merger Guidelines embraced the typical existence of merger efficiencies,
despite the dearth of rigorous evidence underpinning that intellectual
change.53 Although the 1984 MG did not go as far as Bork recommended in
granting presumptive status to efficiencies in a wide range of circumstances,
they marked a significant shift in favor of the recognition of efficiencies,
pronouncing the view that “[t]he primary benefit of mergers to the economy
is their efficiency-enhancing potential, which can increase the competitiveness
of firms and result in lower prices to consumers.”54 This was part of a broader
shift from a focus on the structure of a market (as in the 1968 guidelines) to

48 1982 MG, supra note 20, at 12-13. The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares
(measured from zero to one hundred percent) across all the ﬁrms in a market. To get a sense of what
the thresholds mean, it may be useful to recognize that this deﬁnition implies, for example, an HHI
of 1000 for a market with 10 equal-sized ﬁrms (ten percent share each), 1667 for a market with six
equal-sized ﬁrms, and 2500 for a market with four equal-sized ﬁrms.
49 See 1982 MG, supra note 20, at 14-15; 1984 MG, supra note 22, at 15; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 16 (1997),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NNPGLQL] [hereinafter 1997 HMG]; 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 19.
50 See 1982 MG, supra note 20, at 29 (“Plausible eﬃciencies are far easier to allege than
prove . . . . their magnitudes would be extremely diﬃcult to determine.”).
51 Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Eﬃciencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 707 (2017);
see also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 107, 122 (1990) (“[A]ny [horizontal] merger that generates no synergies . . . raises price.”).
52 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis 2
(Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Competition Policy Ctr. Working Paper No. CPC00-15, 2000) (reviewing
the 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines).
53 See infra, Part III.
54 1984 MG, supra note 22, at 23.
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the recognition of factors, like efficiencies and entry, that could change an
enforcer’s understanding of potential anticompetitive outcomes.55
Some relationship between the HHI standards for presumed harm and
likely merger eﬃciencies was recognized at the time. For example, then-DOJ
economist Frederick Warren-Bolton explained in 1985 that “the very
existence of ‘safe harbor’ Herﬁndahls in the Guidelines already implies a
‘standard deduction’ for eﬃciencies.”56 Two decades later, Michael Salinger,
then-Director of the Bureau of Economics, assured the Antitrust
Modernization Commission that “[e]ﬃciencies do play a key role in our
analysis, although the way they are considered is perhaps less formal than is
suggested by the guidelines” and that “[e]ﬃciencies aﬀect the judgments we
make even if they are not cognizable.”57
This is not surprising. “Since absent any efficiency gains a horizontal merger
will generally (weakly) increase prices, any merger screen that would allow some
mergers and block others must implicitly be relying on some presumption of the
efficiency gain that, on average, should be credited to a typical merger.”58
Despite their claim that eﬃciencies are likely ubiquitous and implicit
acceptance of a “standard eﬃciency credit,” the 1984 MG recognized that
eﬃciencies were unlikely to cure all adverse eﬀects of mergers in more
concentrated settings. They placed the burden on parties to produce “clear
and convincing evidence” of eﬃciencies.59 Still, it was in 1984 that the merger
guidelines created the dynamic that led to the current approach: granting
presumed eﬃciencies to mergers that do not raise particular concentration
55 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 42, at 21 (“In the 1980s both the Supreme Court
and government enforcement policy began to de-emphasize the role of pure structure and added
other factors, including nonstructural features bearing on the risk of collusion, barriers to entry, and
eﬃciencies”). In United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that market-concentration measures were not determinative in light of other market characteristics.
56 Frederick Warren-Boulton, Merger Policy and Enforcement at the Antitrust Division: The
Economist’s View, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 109, 112 (1985).
57 Michael Salinger, Dir., Bureau of Econ., Fed Trade Comm’n, Treatment of Eﬃciencies in
Merger Enforcement 2 (Nov. 17, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/
public_statements/treatment-eﬃciencies-merger-enforcement/051117amcstatement.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/TSG8-R7HH].
58 Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073,
1163 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“[I]t seems appropriate to understand an
eﬃciencies defense to a merger whose suspected anticompetitive eﬀects exceed the threshold as
implicitly involving a claim that the merger synergies are not merely substantial but are large enough
to notably exceed the level ordinarily presumed to exist.”); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust
Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J.
THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 10 (2010) (describing the “standard deduction” and noting that “this idea
might lie behind the established policy of allowing most horizontal mergers without special
showings of eﬃciencies.”); Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, Concentration Screens for
Horizontal Mergers 5 (Apr. 29, 2020) (unpublished paper), http://economics.mit.edu/ﬁles/19692
[https://perma.cc/THP8-72UR].
59 1984 MG, supra note 22, at 23.
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concerns, but requiring parties in cases that are fully investigated to
demonstrate cognizable eﬃciencies suﬃcient to oﬀset the impact of
signiﬁcant reductions in competition.
Those burdens were further described in the 1997 revised guidelines,
designed to “clarify how the agencies analyze eﬃciency claims in mergers”
with an eye to “bring[ing] the analysis of eﬃciencies in mergers up-to-date.”60
The 1997 revisions set out the now-familiar requirements that eﬃciencies be
cognizable, which means that they are (1) merger-speciﬁc, (2) substantiated,
(3) “do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service,”61 and
(4) are suﬃcient to negate harm to consumers through, for example,
preventing price increases.62 In tandem with the 1992 guidelines, the 1997
revision also expressly replaced the requirement that eﬃciencies be
demonstrated by the merging parties by clear and convincing evidence.63
The most recent Horizontal Merger Guidelines were issued in 2010.64 The
treatment of eﬃciencies remained essentially the same as in 1997,65 but the
market concentration standard for the presumption of harm was shifted
upwards—from treating a market above an HHI of 1800 as highly
concentrated to establishing that threshold at an HHI of 2500, and from
treating an increase of more than one hundred points in a highly concentrated
marketed as triggering the structural presumption, to moving to a
requirement that the HHI increase by more than 200 points. This change was
described as reﬂecting the experience of the antitrust agencies;66 retention of
the structural presumption was made over the objection of the ABA Section
of Antitrust Law, which “urge[d] the Agencies to remove the presumption of
illegality keyed to the level and increase in the HHI.”67 A threshold of 2500
60 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC/DOJ Announce Revised Guidelines on Efficiencies
in Mergers 1 (Apr. 8, 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1997/04/ftcdojannounce-revised-guidelines-efficiencies-mergers [https://perma.cc/V7JF-URFV].
61 1997 HMG, supra note 49, at 31.
62 Id.
63 Compare 1997 HMG, supra note 49, at 31 (“[T]he merging ﬁrms must substantiate eﬃciency
claims . . . .”) with 1984 MG, supra note 22, at 23 (stating that the Department will consider
eﬃciencies “[i]f the parties to the merger establish by clear and convincing evidence that a merger
will achieve such eﬃciencies”). The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines removed the “clear and
convincing” requirement. See Table 1, infra. However, the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines did
not specify the burden placed on merging parties. 1992 HMG, supra note 24, at 30-33.
64 2010 HMG, supra note 1.
65 See Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years,
77 ANTITRUST L.J. 702, 707 (2010) (stating that the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines basically
follow the approach of the 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines on eﬃciencies).
66 Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 729 (2018).
67 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Comment Letter on Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines
4 (June 4, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/public_comments/horizontalmerger-guidelines-review-project-proposed-new-horizontal-merger-guidelines-548050-00026/5480
50-00026.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LE3-UHRR]
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for presumptively anticompetitive mergers suggests the possibility that a
merger resulting in four equally-sized competitors would be allowed, a long
way from the approach of the 1968 guidelines.
This synchronized movement toward raising the threshold for presumed
anticompetitive harm in league with the view that eﬃciencies are generally
present and need not be very large to reverse anticompetitive eﬀects68 appears
consistent with our characterization of the agencies acting as if each merger
gets what we have referred to as a standard eﬃciency credit. That can lead to
focusing enforcement primarily on those transactions that trigger the
structural presumption. In other words, the magnitude of the assumed
standard eﬃciency credit impacts the setting of market concentration
standards, which logically should be lower if the agencies believed that
eﬃciencies were rare rather than commonplace.
It is worth emphasizing the Guidelines’ explicit rejection of the total
welfare approach embraced by Williamson and Bork, and insistence that
efficiencies must benefit actual consumers of the merged firm’s products. Thus,
the 2010 HMG explain that “the Agencies consider whether cognizable
efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm
customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that
market.”69 Indeed, “[t]he greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a
merger, the greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must
be passed through to customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger
will not have an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market.”70 In language
that stands in stark contrast with the Williamson-Bork view that increased
profits to the newly-formed company should be balanced against harm to
customers, the Agencies explained that “the antitrust laws give competition,
not internal operational efficiency, primacy in protecting customers.”71
Rejecting the total welfare standard is correct and also has implications
for current critiques of the antitrust agencies’ and courts’ approach to
eﬃciencies that are discussed in Part IV. The total welfare standard can easily
accept harm to competition as a positive outcome—not only increased proﬁts
to the merging ﬁrms, but even increased proﬁts to their horizontal rivals who
68 See Muris, supra note 46, at 420 (“[I]f the defendant can show the existence of nontrivial
economies—that is in the magnitude of only one to two percent—the merger should be presumed
to be procompetitive.”).
69 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 30-31. A similar stance is also embodied in the 2006 HMG
Commentary. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2006 55, https://www.justice.gov/atr/ﬁle/801216/download
[https://perma.cc/TDT2-EVKU] (“As noted in section 4 of the Guidelines, the Agencies seek to
determine ‘whether cognizable eﬃciencies likely would be suﬃcient to reverse the merger’s potential
to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.’”).
70 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 31.
71 Id.
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are freed from the pressure of competition.72 By contrast, asking whether
eﬃciencies negate the potential anticompetitive harm from a merger
appropriate focuses on whether eﬃciencies are passed through to consumers
(in the merger of two ﬁrms that sell to consumers).73
II. EFFICIENCIES AND ECONOMICS
Economics can help guide the appropriate treatment of potential
eﬃciencies in horizontal merger enforcement by providing insight on two
questions: (i) what should qualify as “eﬃciencies” under antitrust law, and (ii)
how prevalent are realized eﬃciencies in horizontal mergers?
While Williamson and Bork fundamentally altered the debate over
eﬃciencies in merger review, their arguments were at their heart based on
theoretical possibilities that have in large part found their way into current
analysis. As we discuss below, the empirical foundation for those possibilities
is at best shaky.
A. What Constitutes an Eﬃciency?
As noted earlier, to be cognizable, the 2010 HMG require that efficiencies
be merger-specific; verifiable; not the fruits of anticompetitive outcomes; and,
if offered in defense of an otherwise anticompetitive merger, ultimately
sufficient to offset all potential anticompetitive outcomes from the merger.74
Although the guidelines are not binding on the judiciary, courts have tended to
articulate the same approach towards identifying and analyzing efficiencies.75
72 See Steven Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer:
The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 351-53 (2010) (noting that
the aggregate welfare standard is satisﬁed where cost savings from production outweigh deadweight
loss stemming from higher consumer prices).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that a
merger can reverse its potentially harmful eﬀects only if it creates adequate downward price
pressure); FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 350 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the
post-merger ﬁrm must “provide clear evidence showing that the merger will result in eﬃciencies
that will oﬀset anticompetitive eﬀects and ultimately beneﬁt consumers”).
74 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 1-2. For purposes of this Article, we rely upon the analysis of
eﬃciencies as stated in the 2010 HMG, focused on whether the eﬀect of a proposed transaction “may
be substantially to lessen competition.” Id. at 1. That is, the existence of eﬃciencies may be used to
show that the eﬀect of a transaction would not be to substantially lessen competition. See also
Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 704 (noting the adoption of an “eﬃciency defense” in the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines).
75 Lawyers and courts continue to debate whether an eﬃciencies defense even exists. See, e.g.,
Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d at 371 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that the congressional proscription of mergers
that substantially lessen competition is not overridable by the presence of price decreases); FTC v.
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (positing that district courts often use an
eﬃciencies defense although the Supreme Court has not authorized its use and the defense often
fails when invoked).

1958

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1941

These standards are well-aligned with the economics of ensuring that
mergers do not cause anticompetitive harm in the markets served by the
merging ﬁrms. There is broad agreement that an eﬃciency must be resource
saving, that is, an improvement in the economics of value creation, such as a
reduction in the real resources required to produce a given product, or an
improvement in the product that is achieved without the need for increased
resources.76 Economic eﬃciencies are distinguished from purely ﬁnancial
gains by excluding pecuniary eﬀects, and speciﬁcally excluding cost
reductions that accrue from an increase of market power.77 “Revenue
synergies” that derive from the ability to raise prices following the
elimination of competition between ﬁrms are evidence of competitive harm,
even if they motivate Wall Street dealmakers, CEOs, and shareholders. In
the words of the 2010 HMG, eﬃciencies “enhance the merged ﬁrm’s ability
and incentive to compete”;78 they do not enhance the merged ﬁrm’s ability
and incentive to harm competition.
Cost reductions arising from productivity gains exemplify this standard.
Consider a hypothetical merger of two small beer manufacturers that each
have one brewery; one is located in the Southeast and the other in the
Northeast. A merger would permit them to produce both beers at each
brewery, substantially reducing transportation costs to each brand’s more
distant markets. Such a merger could, in theory, lead to lower delivered prices
and higher output, if cost reductions were sufficiently large and the likely
diminution of competition post-merger was sufficiently small such that the
new firm’s most profitable strategy was to expand sales.79 The 2010 HMG tells
76 E.g., Williamson, supra note 33, at 19 (noting the “appropriate” “distinction” drawn by Justice
Douglas in Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) between
“economies . . . merely pecuniary rather than real”); Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 704, 709 (noting
that mergers are permitted when they lead to cost savings product improvements).
77 See Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d at 349, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Millett C.J. concurring) (“[T]here is no
dispute that, to have any legal relevance, a proffered efficiency cannot arise from anticompetitive effects.”).
78 HMG 2010, supra note 1, at 29.
79 Even if eﬃciencies are large enough to oﬀset the unilateral incentive to raise prices, they
may be dwarfed by the possibility of increased coordination with other rivals post-merger. In such
cases, the merger should be blocked. For an illustration of this danger, see Nathan H. Miller &
Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Eﬀects of the Miller-Coors Joint Venture, 85
ECONOMETRICA 1763, 1788-89 (2017), which performs an ex post empirical analysis of the 2008
SABMiller-Molson Coors joint venture that ﬁnds evidence of increased price due to enhanced
coordinated eﬀects. The joint venture had a fact pattern akin to this hypothetical. The Department
of Justice (DOJ) cited “substantial and credible savings that [would] signiﬁcantly reduce the
companies’ costs of producing and distributing beer” in its closing statement clearing the merger.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on
its Decision to Close its Investigation of the Joint Venture Between SABMiller PLC and Molson
Coors Brewing Company (June 5, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/
press_releases/2008/233845.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NUJ-PLHC]. Miller and Weinberg find that
despite significant realized efficiencies from the joint venture, prices increased following its close due
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us that “efficiencies resulting from shifting production among facilities
formerly owned separately, which enable the merging firms to reduce the
incremental cost of production, are more likely to be susceptible to verification
and are less likely to result from anticompetitive reductions in output.”80
Improved incentives to compete eﬃciently, such as the ability to produce
more or higher quality output with the same level of cost, are also recognized
as eﬃciencies.81 In the interest of simplicity, we refer to cost-reducing
eﬃciencies, but implicitly incorporate enhanced product quality, innovation
or other potential eﬃciency beneﬁts.
Not every merger-related cost reduction is an eﬃciency. So-called
“pecuniary” beneﬁts, such as tax savings, do not qualify.82 As the DOJ has
explained: “Economics distinguishes between a ‘real’ savings and a
‘pecuniary’ savings. The former enlarges the pie shared by all members of
society. The latter enlarges one slice by shrinking one or more other slices.”83
Because they do not result in resource savings but are merely transfers,
pecuniary savings are not properly recognized as “eﬃciencies,” even if they
trigger a ﬁnancial gain to the merging ﬁrm.84
to its facilitation of greater tacit collusion between Miller-Coors and Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI).
The DOJ cited these coordinated effects in its 2013 complaint and settlement of ABI’s proposed
acquisition of Grupo Modelo. See Complaint at 13-14, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV,
No. CV 13-127(RWR), 2013 WL 7018607 (D.D.C. 2013) (referencing ABI’s “strategic plan for pricing
in the United States that reads like a how-to manual for successful price coordination”); see also
Competitive Impact Statement at 7, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, No. CV 13127(RWR), 2013 WL 7018607 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[L]arge brewers engage in significant levels of tacit
coordination and that coordination has reduced competition and increased prices.”).
80 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 31.
81 See infra Part I. Credibly quantifying expected merger-speciﬁc quality improvement is even
more diﬃcult than predicting price eﬀects and should be subject to a high bar. See FTC v. H.J.
Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing, but ultimately rejecting, claimed qualityenhancing eﬃciencies).
82 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 970e (2019); see also FTC v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 604 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that cognizable eﬃciencies “must
be shown in what economists label ‘real’ terms, that is in terms of resources applied to the
accomplishment of the objective”); FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 349 (3d
Cir. 2016) (requiring “what economists label ‘real’ terms”); Williamson, supra note 33, at 24 (“The
relevant eﬀects are those which take the form of real rather than pecuniary economies.”).
83 Corrected Brief of Appellees The United States of America and Plaintiff States at 59, United
States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-1493); See also Warren-Boulton, supra note
56, at 112-13 (distinguishing “real” efficiencies, such as a merger that results in greater output using
fewer inputs, from pecuniary efficiencies, including tax gains and the creation of monopsony power).
84 This article does not discuss eﬃciencies in the context of vertical mergers. It is worth
pointing out, however, that the antitrust agencies have proposed that eﬃciencies claimed in vertical
mergers be assessed under the same standards as in horizontal mergers. See 2020 Draft Vertical
Guidelines, supra note 2 , at 9. But, there is a considerable debate about the extent to which claimed
elimination of double marginalization should be scrutinized in the same manner as eﬃciencies
(putting aside, for the moment, whether elimination of double marginalization meets the deﬁnition
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Of particular importance are transactions in which merging parties claim
benefits that arise from the acquisition of upstream market power.85 The 2010
HMG explain that efficiencies cannot be the product of “anticompetitive
reductions in output or service.”86 As explained by Scott Hemphill and
Nancy Rose,
[S]avings achieved through the exercise of increased classical monopsony
power or bargaining leverage are premised on a reduction in competition.
Under existing law developed mainly in the analysis of output markets, such
‘beneﬁts’ are not cognizable eﬃciencies. Such a savings does not count as an
antitrust beneﬁt, even if it is passed through to downstream purchasers.87

This argument is featured in the DOJ’s 2016 challenge to the proposed merger
of two of health insurers, Anthem and Cigna. There, the merging parties
claimed their expected reductions in payments to providers such as doctors
and hospitals would be delivered as a beneﬁt to their customers in the form
of lower prices. Disagreeing, the DOJ alleged that “Anthem’s defense that its
acquisition of Cigna will enable it to lower reimbursement rates conﬁrms
rather than refutes the anticompetitive purpose and eﬀect of the
acquisition.”88 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit aﬃrmed the DOJ position, concluding that the exercise of
monopsony power is as inimical to competition as is the exercise of monopoly
power and “a proﬀered eﬃciency cannot arise from anticompetitive eﬀects.”89
A cognizable eﬃciency further must reduce the incremental production
cost (or increase the incremental product value) in order to undo the upward
pricing pressure that results from the diminution of competition between the
of an eﬃciency). See id. at 7 (noting that the Department of Justice will generally rely on the parties
to demonstrate the elimination of double marginalization); Becerra et al., supra note 2, at 21-23
(claiming that claims of elimination of double marginalization should be analyzed under the general
standard applicable to eﬃciencies); Jonathan Sallet, The Future of Vertical Mergers and The Thing
Called ‘EDM’”, THE WASHINGTON CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH: COMPETITIVE EDGE (Mar.
19, 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/competitive-edge-the-future-of-vertical-mergers-and-thething-called-edm/ [https://perma.cc/XUF8-X7RV] (“[T]he antitrust agencies need to clarify their
ﬁnal [vertical merger] guidelines to make plain that claims of EDM are to be presented and assessed
the same as any other claimed procompetitive beneﬁt.”).
85 For further discussion of mergers of competing buyers and potential sources of eﬃciencies
in such transactions, see 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 32-33.
86 Id. at 30.
87 Hemphill & Rose, supra note 8, at 2082.
88 Plaintiﬀs’ Supplemental Memorandum on the Buy-Side Case at 4, United States v. Anthem,
Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-1493) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978)), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/ﬁle/920331/download
[https://perma.cc/B964-9YQM].
89 Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d at 369 (Millet, J., concurring); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 82, at § 975i (discounting a claimed eﬃciency that “simply transfers income from supplier to
purchaser without any resource savings.”).
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merging ﬁrms. Purely ﬁxed cost savings, even if realized, may increase a ﬁrm’s
proﬁtability, but generally do not induce the ﬁrm to increase output or reduce
prices, as those decisions depend only on the ﬁrm’s marginal costs, not its
average costs. Such ﬁxed cost reductions would not oﬀset the competitive
harm and would not be considered a cognizable eﬃciency.90
This understanding of what is an eﬃciency leaves the question: How
frequent and of what magnitude in horizontal mergers are such eﬃciencies?
We turn next to that discussion.
B. What is the Economic Evidence on Eﬃciencies?
It is tempting to infer that the embrace of efficiencies in 1984 rested on a
foundation of rigorous empirical evidence that merger motivations and effects
were dominated by efficiencies. That would be wrong. The economic
scholarship of that period on merger efficiencies seems to have been at first
premised on theoretical discourse on their possibility, even then often heavily
caveated, as in Williamson’s 1968 work.91 Some, like Harold Demsetz,
observed that an empirical correlation of profits and firm size in concentrated
markets could as easily arise from efficiencies of scale as from market power.92
That does not prove that mergers induce efficiencies. But those arguments
seem to have quickly been transformed from a caution about theoretical costs
of proposals to break up large firms where economies of scale are important to
the logical fallacy that this implied merger enforcement was too stringent.93
90 See Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 731 (noting that the 2010 HMG require that signiﬁcant
eﬃciencies be proven and passed on to consumers such that the post-merger price is no higher than
the pre-merger price). A ﬁxed cost reduction that facilitates entry or innovation may have the
potential to oﬀset competitive harm in the longer-run, but there is scant theoretical or empirical
reason to expect merger-induced overhead or ﬁxed cost reductions to have that character. Moreover,
the delayed impact and greater uncertainty of beneﬁts resting on future entry appropriately lead
these to be down-weighted in merger analysis. See 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 4 (“Explicit or implicit
evidence that the merging parties intend to raise prices, reduce output or capacity, reduce product
quality or variety, withdraw products or delay their introduction, or curtail research and
development eﬀorts after the merger, or explicit or implicit evidence that the ability to engage in
such conduct motivated the merger, can be highly informative in evaluating the likely eﬀects of a
merger.”). Merger-related reductions in some ﬁxed costs also could exacerbate rather than oﬀset
competitive harm over time; for example, reductions in research and development expenditures may
reduce future innovations.
91 E.g., Williamson, supra note 33.
92 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 5-9 (1973) (documenting higher rates of return for larger rather than smaller ﬁrms in highly
concentrated 3-digit industries, and increases in this gap as concentration rises, and arguing these
are consistent with the competitive growth of eﬃcient ﬁrms).
93 Id. at 9 (concluding these correlations “must increase our doubts, however slightly, about the
beneficial effects of an active deconcentration or anti-merger policy”). In equilibrating deconcentration
(divestiture) and anti-merger policy, Demsetz commits the logical and economic fallacy of inferring
that if greater efficiency makes firms large, it must be that making firms large by merger makes them
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The appeal of the Chicago School’s simple assertion of the inevitability of
competitive markets captivated not only Bork, but increasingly many antitrust
enforcers and the judiciary. Unfortunately, the growing belief in the ubiquity
of merger efficiencies by the enforcement and judicial community was at
increasing odds with economic evidence. As empirically-trained economists
focused further on what data revealed about the relationship between mergers
and efficiencies, the results cast considerable doubt on post-merger benefits.
As discussed at length by Professor Hovenkamp, “the empirical evidence is
not unanimous, however, it strongly suggests that current merger policy tends
to underestimate harm, overestimate efficiencies, or some combination of the
two.”94 The business literature is even more skeptical. As management
consultant McKinsey & Company reported in 2010: “Most mergers are
doomed from the beginning. Anyone who has researched merger success rates
knows that roughly 70 percent of mergers fail.”95
Two strands of the economic literature are particularly informative on the
question of what our working assumption should be about the prevalence and
economic significance of efficiencies in mergers, particularly horizontal mergers.
First are merger retrospectives that analyze ex post price, or more rarely,
product quality, impacts from mergers. If merger-induced efficiencies—or
similar effects from easy entry, product repositioning, powerful customers, and
the like96—are sufficient to offset any reduction in competition, prices should
be stable or falling following a merger, all else equal.97 Evidence that
consummated mergers often are associated with price increases or quality
efficient. Those citing to Demsetz as proof of efficiencies favoring mergers succumb to this fallacy and
overlook the considerably more modest conclusion Demsetz draws from his evidence.
94 Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 726, 727-29. For a review of the extensive literature cited in
his discussion, see id. at 728-730 nn.146-53.
95 MCKINSEY & CO., PERSPECTIVES ON MERGER INTEGRATION 11 (2010),
https://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/organization/latest_thinking/~/media/1002A11EEA40458
99124B917EAC7404C.ashx [https://perma.cc/TC7U-VJ7U].
96 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 20-22, 27-29 (discussing unilateral effects from mergers, the impact
of a powerful buyer resulting from a merger, and entry barriers to new firms entering industries).
97 If the merger improves product quality or customer services, this statement would apply to
quality-adjusted prices that are stable or falling. This often is diﬃcult to measure well, and it can be
even more diﬃcult to establish what the outcome would have been in the absence of the merger,
what economists refer to as the counterfactual state and lawyers frequently call the hypothetical and
what both often refer to as the “but for” world. Moreover, the assertion that an increase in output
accompanied by rising prices is proof of greater consumer value is too frequently misunderstood or
misapplied. For an example of the Court’s erroneous argument, see Ohio v. American Express Co., in
which the court held that the fact that total credit card transactions increased 30% between 2008 and
2013 demonstrated that American Express antisteering provisions neither restricted output nor
raised price. 138 S.Ct. 2274 (2018); see also id. at 2302 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (correcting the majority’s
error by stating “the relevant restriction of output is as compared with a hypothetical world in which
the restraint was not present and prices were lower . . . a comparison between reality and a
hypothetical state of aﬀairs”).
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degradation is inconsistent with the prevalence of sufficient merger efficiencies.
Stable or falling prices do not themselves prove that efficiencies or other
antidotes to reduced competition are common. But if merger enforcement is
effective, mergers that reduce competition and lead to higher prices should be
rare, regardless of whether there generally are merger efficiencies.
Read in this light, results from the merger retrospective literature provide
little support for a belief in the prevalence of substantial eﬃciencies.
Published retrospective analyses tend to focus on markets in which detailed
price data are readily available to economists, which makes them far from a
random sample of all industries, let alone of all mergers.98 Despite this
limitation, there is a rich literature studying consummated mergers across a
diverse set of industries, including airlines, appliances, beer, various
consumer package goods, electric utilities, hospitals, industrial products,
insurance, mobile telephone service, petroleum reﬁning and retail gasoline,
publishing, retailing, and many others.99 A common theme emerges from
these studies: consummated horizontal mergers, particularly in concentrated
markets, frequently are associated with consumer losses, and infrequently are
associated with consumer beneﬁts. This is consistent with market power
eﬀects dominating any potential eﬃciency gains, or no eﬃciencies at all.
The most thorough meta-analysis of the horizontal merger retrospective
literature is provided by John Kwoka, who reviewed more than 200
retrospective studies of horizontal transactions and compares results across a
subset curated to ensure quality control and comparability.100 Of the 101
product prices analyzed in the individual merger studies, sixty-six
experienced increases averaging 9.5%, while 35 experienced price declines
98 This is what economists call “sample selection.” The data are not drawn from all possible
mergers, but only those not successfully deterred or blocked by antitrust enforcement. This selection
would tend to bias results toward ﬁnding no price increases. There may be a second source of
potential selection bias, if the mergers economists choose to study are not a random selection of all
relevant mergers. These limit the inferences one can draw for the entire universe of possible
mergers. In theory, there also could be publication bias if “null” results are less likely to be published
by journals, but this is unlikely to tilt the published literature toward either price increases or price
decreases, since either ﬁnding would be of substantial interest.
99 Many of these are cited and discussed in numerous meta-analyses of merger retrospectives.
See, e.g., JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 87-91 (2015) (showing the results from a curated set of studies meeting
certain quality criteria that include single-merger price eﬀect estimates for 49 mergers between 1976
and 2006, with most in the 1990s, and 19 additional multi-merger studies covering hundreds of
mergers between 1980 and 2004); Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, Did
Robert Bork Understate the Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 57 J.L. ECON. S67,
S77 (2014) (analyzing “49 distinct studies examining mergers taking place in 21 industries published
over the last 30 years”); Malcolm B. Coate, A Retrospective on Merger Retrospectives in the United States,
12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 209, 209 (2016) (estimating challenge probabilities arising from
merger retrospectives using the FTC’s enforcement activity).
100 KWOKA, supra note 99, at 6-7.
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averaging 3.3%.101 Seventeen of the industry multi-merger studies reported
price estimates, averaging a 5.4% increase across the entire group.102 These
ﬁndings, and the weight of evidence from this broad literature suggest greater
skepticism toward the assertion of ubiquitous horizontal merger eﬃciencies,
and particularly that they are suﬃcient generally to oﬀset competitive harm
near the enforcement margin.103 While some recent papers have questioned
whether eﬃciencies might emerge over longer periods of time, their results
suggest little reason to believe that accounting for longer-run eﬀects would
reverse the conclusion of the overall retrospective literature.104
A second strand of literature attempts to measure directly the efficiency
changes associated with mergers. Ex post merger efficiencies are challenging to
measure and understudied, but a small but growing economics literature has
attempted the feat. A number of early econometric analyses of ex post merger
performance across sectors used the Federal Trade Commission’s 1974-1977
manufacturing Line of Business database. An example is Dennis Mueller’s
(1985) study that reports substantial declines in market shares for acquired
units, suggesting reduced competitiveness and hence competition postmerger.105 Higher post-merger profitability, even when accurately measured,
Id. at 96.
Id. at 147. But see Michael Vita & F. David Osinski, John Kwoka’s Mergers, Merger Control,
and Remedies: A Critical Review, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 361, 377-81 (2018) (criticizing Kwoka’s
methodology, which does not provide standard errors on these estimates, making it diﬃcult to
determine their precision); Coate supra note 99 (identifying authors who criticize Kwoka’s work as
uninformative on the eﬀectiveness of merger enforcement, due, for example, to the
unrepresentativeness of the mergers studied). Most of these critiques are not directly relevant to
the question of merger eﬃciencies suﬃcient to oﬀset anticompetitive price eﬀects.
103 See also Coate, supra note 99, at 209 (observing that estimated price eﬀects tend to line up
with the probability of a merger challenge, with price increases most likely in markets that are very
likely to be challenged based on structural analysis).
104 For an example of a paper arguing that price eﬀects after the ﬁrst year may be reversed in
the second year post-merger, see Franco Mariuzzo & Peter L. Ormosi, Post-merger Price Dynamics
Matters, So Why Do Merger Retrospectives Ignore It?, 55 REV. INDUS. ORG. 403, 419 (2019). Another
study, of two railroad mergers, shows large increases in the price of grain shipments in the year
following the merger, with quite variable subsequent price changes, and a long-term trend of slightly
higher prices based on traditional diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates. See Cliﬀord Winston, Vikram
Maheshri & Scott M. Dennis, Long-Run Eﬀects of Mergers: The Case of U.S. Western Railroads, 54 J.L.
& ECON. 275 (2011) (explaining that structural model estimates that use of diﬀerent counterfactuals
suggest relatively small adverse long-run impacts on consumer surplus for one merger). One recent
study claiming large dynamic eﬃciencies is based not on post-merger data but on a calibrated
theoretical model. Yonghong An & Wei Zhao, Dynamic Eﬃciencies of the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas Merger, 50 RAND J. ECON. 666, 666 (2019) (ﬁnding that “the merger led to lower prices”
and “net consumer surplus increased by as much as $5.14 billion,” but these are results using a
simulated econometric model to infer counterfactual impacts of the merger, and are not based on
any data on actual Boeing costs pre- or post-merger).
105 Dennis C. Mueller, Mergers and Market Share, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 259, 259 (1985)
(analyzing data on 5-digit product classes for units of 209 of the largest 1000 manufacturing
companies, and ﬁnding that by 1972 an unacquired business retained 88% of its 1950 market share,
101
102
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does not distinguish between market power and efficiencies as a source, but
lower post-merger profitability suggests that mergers fail, on net, on both
dimensions. While the mergers in David Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer’s 1987
study are disproportionately from the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s,
they conclude “the combination of evidence covering the horizontal subset of
our . . . sample suggests that on average horizontal acquisitions, like
conglomerate mergers, were followed by deteriorating profit performance.” 106
Roughly contemporaneous studies of horizontal mergers in Europe, which had
less stringent antitrust enforcement at the time, reached similarly pessimistic
conclusions on post-merger performance.107 Richard Caves, writing in 1989,
concluded that “traditional modes of investigating [mergers’] ex post
productivity sustain a fragile case for [efficiencies] at best, and several
important recent investigations provide strongly negative evidence.”108
A handful of more recent studies have estimated eﬃciency eﬀects from
production-function based analyses that include more recent mergers. Only
those that examine cost eﬃciencies are informative on the eﬃciency question
relevant to merger enforcement policy; “revenue productivity,” ﬁnancial
returns on assets, or similar measures intermingle the eﬀects of price
increases with cost savings, and without careful work to disentangle those
two, cannot inform the debate on whether merger-speciﬁc eﬃciencies oﬀset
increases in market power.109 This work ranges from studies of a small number
in contrast to only 18% for an acquired business). Note that declining market share could also be a
manifestation of market power, exercised through output restriction and higher prices.
106 DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F. M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY 224 (1987); see also id. at 76-77 (analyzing 2955 lines of business for the 1000 largest
manufacturing companies in 1950, of which 2238 had been involved in an acquisition).
107 See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF MERGERS: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (1980) (describing the results of a collection of studies of mergers in
Europe and the U.S., which found that merger effects on profitability are at best mixed and tend toward
negative); RAVENSCRAFT & SCHERER, Id. , at 220 n.7 (citing references that provide examples).
108 Richard E. Caves, Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Eﬃciency: Foresight vs. Hindsight, 7
INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 151, 152 (1989). See also Lars-Hendrick Röller, Johan Stennik & Frank
Verboven, Eﬃciency Gains from Mergers 9, 43 (Discussion Paper 00-09, Aug. 2000) (describing that
“the impact of eﬃciency gains on price is more than oﬀset by increased market power, at least in the
cases studied in the economics literature” and “there seems to be no support for a general
presumption that mergers create eﬃciency gains” although they do sometimes do so).
109 Examples of studies that focus on measures of revenue productivity include Vojislav
Maksimovic & Gordon Phillips, The Market for Corporate Assets: Who Engages in Mergers and Asset
Sales and Are There Eﬃciency Gains?, 56 J. FIN. 2019, 2040 (2001) (estimating predicted output using
a regression of log of the total value of shipments) and Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller, B. Burcin
Yurtoglu & Christine Zulehner, The Eﬀects of Mergers: An International Comparison, 21 INT’L. J.
INDUS. ORG. 625 (2003). Gugler et al. measure revenues and proﬁts and argue that mergers that
increase both must increase what they term eﬃciencies. Their empirical analysis of more than 2700
mergers worldwide leads them to conclude: “[i]f one categorizes mergers that increase market power
or that reduce eﬃciency as welfare reducing, then a majority of the mergers taking place around the
world over the last 15 years appear to be welfare reducing.” Id. at 651.
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of mergers in a particular well-deﬁned industry to those aggregating evidence
from hundreds of mergers across broad sectors and time periods.
One of the most expansive studies, by Bruce Blonigen and Justin Pierce,
uses plant-level data from the 1997-2007 Census of Manufacturing to
separately identify mark-up and productivity eﬀects from plant-level
acquisitions across the entire manufacturing sector. They ﬁnd that while postmerger mark-ups rise considerably, particularly for horizontal acquisitions,
there is no evidence of statistically or economically signiﬁcant productivity
gains: “evidence for increased average markups from M&A activity is
signiﬁcant and robust. In contrast, we ﬁnd little evidence for plant- or ﬁrmlevel productivity eﬀects from M&A activity on average, nor for other
eﬃciency gains often cited as possible from M&A activity . . . .”110 A similar
conclusion is reached by John Kwoka and Michael Pollitt in their study of
electric utility mergers.111 Robert Kulnick’s analysis of mergers in the readymix concrete industry over 1977-1992 ﬁnds no evidence of productivity
increases in plants acquired prior to the 1982 MG, and increased productivity
that is insuﬃcient to oﬀset increased market power, resulting in higher prices,
for horizontal mergers after 1982.112 Overall, the results from eﬀorts to
directly measure merger-induced eﬃciencies provide little support for the
propositions that horizontal mergers are either motivated by or eﬀective in
producing signiﬁcant economic eﬃciency gains.
The empirical designs, markets, and mergers studied vary widely across
the empirical economic studies that attempt to measure ex post merger
eﬀects. The results reveal heterogeneity in outcomes, and the limitations of
this literature suggest that the debate would beneﬁt from further empirical
work to both reﬁne the analysis and synthesize the ﬁndings. But the
conclusions of this broad literature cast signiﬁcant doubt on an assumption
of widespread prevalence of merger-related eﬃciencies suﬃcient to overcome
the adverse eﬀects of increased market power. The Guidelines may be correct
in noting the potential for merger-related eﬃciencies to improve economic

110 Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Eﬀects of Mergers on Market Power and
Eﬃciency 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22750, 2016).
111 See John Kwoka & Michael Pollitt, Do Mergers Improve Eﬃciency? Evidence from Restructuring
the US Electric Power Sector, 28 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 645, 646, 654 (2010) (providing an analysis of
seventy-three electric utility mergers in 1994–2004 and indicating “some of the strongest evidence
against the theory of eﬃcient mergers and the market for corporate control,” in the ﬁnding that
“target ﬁrms’ post-eﬃciency actually declines” and “[a]cquiring ﬁrms record little or no gain to oﬀset
these eﬃciency losses by the acquired ﬁrms”).
112 Robert B. Kulick, Ready-to-Mix: Horizontal Mergers, Prices, and Productivity 35 (U.S. Census
Bureau Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. CES-WP- 17-38, 2017). The 1982 MG introduced
HHI analysis and new, less stringent, concentration thresholds, replacing the stricter approach to
merger enforcement taken in 1968. See supra, Table 1; supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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outcomes, but it appears that they have been far too optimistic in believing
these are in fact realized as a “primary beneﬁt of mergers.”113
III. THE MANY: MERGERS THAT DON’T GET A SECOND LOOK
As we have seen, assumptions about the likely existence and impact of
eﬃciencies are embedded in the very deﬁnition of anticompetitive harm
likely to be caused by horizontal mergers.114 In this Part we consider the
implication that, as a result, some horizontal mergers that should be fully
investigated are not.115
Under the Hart–Scott–Rodino Act,116 mergers and acquisitions meeting
ﬁnancial thresholds must notify the federal antitrust agencies of their intent
to consummate their transactions, thus triggering the opportunity for agency
review.117 For example, in ﬁscal year 2018, the most recent year for which data
is available, 2,028 notices were ﬁled.118 Early termination was granted in 1,170,
or 58%, of the transactions, leaving 42% potentially available for a full Second

2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 29.
Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 709 (stating that “[t]oday, the view held by the Agencies and
expressed in the Merger Guidelines is that most mergers are socially beneﬁcial because they lead to
cost reductions or improved output” and “[a]s a result, a background analysis about eﬃciencies is
built into the initial analysis”).
115 A particularly important practical problem needs to be confronted at the outset. The antitrust
agencies need greater resources to do their jobs. As noted above, resource allocation may be an
important reason for the treatment of some, or even many, of these mergers. KADES, supra note 11.
116 See supra Section II.A (explaining the changes to antitrust enforcement wrought by the
Hart–Scott–Rodino Act).
117 On occasion, the federal antitrust agencies seek to dissolve consummated mergers. See, e.g., In
re Otto Bock HealthCare N. Am., Inc., Docket No. 9378, 1 (FTC Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0231/otto-bock-healthcarefreedom-innovations
[https://perma.cc/EK4K-25J9] (“[T]he Commission addresses a host of issues that may be particularly
salient in consummated mergers, such as whether an agreement to ‘hold separate’ the acquired assets
eliminated anticompetitive effects and whether a proposed divestiture absolved the merging parties of
liability.”); J. THOMAS ROSCH, FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMMATED MERGER CHALLENGES—
THE PAST IS NEVER DEAD 2-6 (Mar. 29, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_statements/consummated-merger-challenges-past-never-dead/120329springmeeting
speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7F8-3J8U] (discussing premerger notification filing regulations).
118 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2018 5 n.9, app. A [hereinafter 2018 HSR REPORT] (describing “Adjusted
Transactions In Which A Second Request Could Have Been Issued” which refers to the number of
transactions eligible for a second request. It is a subset of the total transactions reported and excludes
transactions that were eligible for a list of preliminary exemptions or were otherwise withdrawn).
We treat this adjusted number as the universe of applications for the purpose of our analysis.
113
114
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Request investigation.119 For present purposes, we assume that all grants of
early termination were appropriate.120
Of the applications eligible for a Second Request in 2018, only 5.2%
received a Second Request.121 The average between 2007 and 2018 was higher,
at 8.5% per year, but in none of these years did more than 11% receive a full
investigation.122 Indeed, while the number of eligible transactions has been
steadily increasing over the past six years, the absolute number of Second
Request investigations has remained largely ﬂat.123
The impact of this is illustrated in Figure 2. From the end of the 20072009 recession to 2018, the percent of overall eligible transactions that
received a second request has decreased at an average of 0.22% per year. This
resulted in a drop by roughly half in the probability of a Second Request over
this period, from a high of 10.8% in 2009 to just 5.2% in 2018. A similar drop
occurred in overall Second Request Rate (reﬂected in the bottom line).

119 Id. at app. A; see infra Table A1, Appendix. The percentage of transactions that were not
granted early termination (and thus eligible for full-blown investigations) averaged 38% between
2007 and 2018.
120 It is impossible to know how many early terminations are appropriately granted, making
the assumption that all are correctly a conservative one. Even with this favorable assumption, which
signiﬁcantly lowers the universe of applications eligible for a Second Request, the percentage of
eligible mergers that were fully investigated averages only 8.5% for the relevant period. Infra Table
A2, Appendix. An even lower percentage results from comparing all of the HSR transactions
(including early terminations) to the percentage of Second Requests. Second Requests are issued
for only between 2.2% to 4.5% of total transactions. Infra Table A2, Appendix.
121 See infra Table A2, Appendix. The decision to issue a Second Request is typically informed
by a preliminary investigation. There is no current public data available on the number of
preliminary investigations opened in a year.
122 Infra Table A2, Appendix.
123 Infra Table A2, Appendix. In 2010, the ABA Section of Antitrust Law told the antitrust
agencies that “most transactions, even those that combine competitors, ultimately are not challenged,
and often are not even extensively investigated.” ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 67, at 2.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Transactions Receiving Second Requests as
Portion of Total Transactions and of Eligible Transactions after
Early Termination Review, 2007–2018, by Year124
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In deciding whether to initiate a full-ﬂedged investigation, the agencies
consider the degree of competitive threat that a merger is likely to pose. For
example, agencies commonly interview business customers to assess their
reaction to a proposed merger between companies that make commercial sales
(for example, sale of oﬃce supplies to businesses). Such early-stage reviews
124 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016 6 [hereinafter 2016 HSR REPORT] (presenting the percentage of
transactions resulting in second requests for all fiscal years between 2007 and 2016); id. at app. A
(presenting the number of transactions eligible for second requests, the number of transactions
requesting early termination, number of transactions not granted early termination requests, and
number of transactions in which a second request was issued for all fiscal years between 2007 and 2016);
2018 HSR REPORT, supra note 118, at 6 (presenting the percentage of transactions resulting in second
requests for all fiscal years between 2009 and 2018); id. at app. A (presenting the number of transactions
eligible for second requests, the number of transactions requesting early termination, number of
transactions not granted early termination requests, and number of transactions in which a second
request was issued for all fiscal years between 2009 and 2018). The percentage of second request-eligible
transactions not granted early termination in which second requests were issued was calculated by
removing the number of transactions that were granted an early termination request from the total
number of second request-eligible transactions, then dividing the number of second requests made in
each year by resulting number of second request-eligible transactions not granted early termination in
that year. 2016 HSR Report, supra, at app. A; 2018 HSR Report, supra note 118, at app. A.
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typically inquire into the merging parties’ respective market share and, to the
extent possible, apply the market concentration standards established by the
2010 HMG to assess whether a proposed merger is likely to harm
competition.125 Despite the admonition of the 2010 HMG that mergers
falling short of the structural presumption may nonetheless create a risk of
competitive harm, such mergers seem to garner little attention.126
In their informational requests that precede the decision whether to open
a full investigation, the agencies do seek information about eﬃciencies. For
example, the HSR ﬁling requires merging parties to include then-existing
eﬃciencies/synergies documents.127 The Department of Justice further seeks

125 As discussed above, the 2010 HMG provides that mergers resulting in highly concentrated
markets, which are defined as having an HHI above 2500, and in which the merger would cause an
increase of more than 200 points “will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.” 2010 HMG,
supra note 1, at 19. This is the so-called structural presumption, which the agencies state “may be
rebutted by persuasive evidence that the merger is unlikely to enhance market power” and that traces
its origin back to United States v. Philadelphia National Bank. Id.; supra notes 29-31 and accompanying
text. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structures, and
Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018) (arguing that the structural presumption is strongly
supported by economic theory and evidence and suggesting ways to strengthen the presumption).
126 Markets with an HHI between 1500 and 2500 are “moderately concentrated” and mergers
resulting in a moderately concentrated market that increase HHI by more than 100 points
“potentially raise signiﬁcant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny.” 2010 HMG, supra
note 1, at 19. The information available in public reports and our understanding of the internal
review processes suggest that moderately concentrated markets do not often trigger Second
Requests. See, e.g., 2016 HSR REPORT, supra note 124, at app. A; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017 app. A,
[hereinafter 2017 HSR REPORT]; 2018 HSR REPORT, supra note 118, at app. A (demonstrating the
relatively low rate of second requests relative to the overall number of transactions); see also Coate,
supra note 99, at 13, 19, 36 tbl.5 (brieﬂy describing the merger catalog analysis, explaining the author’s
use of merger data to analyze the number of pre-merger rivals and the Herﬁndahl statistics, and
demonstrating the signiﬁcantly lower rate of challenges of transactions in markets with ﬁve or more
rivals with HHI ﬁgures of less than 3000). Mergers that result in a highly concentrated market but
without an increase of HHI of more than 200 are to receive the same scrutiny, although it is not
clear that they do. See 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 19 (stating that “[m]ergers resulting in highly
concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of between 100 points and 200 points
potentially raise signiﬁcant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny”).
127 See ITEM 4(C)TIP SHEET, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2012), https://www.ftc.
gov/sites/default/ﬁles/attachments/hsr-resources/4ctipsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS6R-NNJC]
(analyzing competition factors); Item 4(d) Tip Sheet, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/premerger-notiﬁcation-program/hsr-resources/pno-guidance-item-4d [https://perma.
cc/ZTD2-QEHF] (last visited May 12, 2020) (discussing synergies); see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL ch. 3, at 34 (5th ed. 2012). Per the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Manual,

For proposed merger investigations, staﬀ should discuss the transaction itself
(including any complaints received or concern expressed in the press); theory(ies) of
competitive harm; possible product markets; possible geographic markets; best
estimate of market shares; ease or diﬃculty of entry and potential barriers; possible
eﬃciencies; the signiﬁcance of the matter (including any unusual reasons to pursue or
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evidence that validates claimed eﬃciencies,128 and the FTC encourages ﬁrms
to provide evidence that claimed eﬃciencies are cognizable.129
Even still, antitrust agencies spend little time formally analyzing the
existence of eﬃciencies before deciding whether to issue a Second Request
for a simple reason—detailed information suﬃcient to support an analysis is
seldom available at that stage.130 One legal commentator suggests that the
FTC lawyers are more skeptical of eﬃciencies claims than are their economist
colleagues and that “[t]o the extent the agencies ultimately cite eﬃciencies
considerations in clearing mergers, antitrust practitioners report that they are
often treated as ‘icing on the cake’ in cases where there are no serious concerns
about anticompetitive eﬀects.”131
In fact, a review of FTC merger investigations from 1989-2016 shows a very
strong relationship between challenging a horizontal merger and market
structure. Not surprisingly, mergers to monopoly “are almost always
challenged,”132 with clear ease-of-entry evidence, well-situated power buyers, or
unique facts on efficiencies required for the merger to be cleared. This analysis
by Malcolm Coate reports that an average of 36.7% of the complete sample
(1989-2016) of mergers and 27.5% of the restricted (1993-2016) sample fall into
not to pursue it); the initial investigative approach; and the outcome of any past
investigations in the industry.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added). The Department of Justice states in addition that
[a]s early as the preliminary investigation phase of a merger investigation, staﬀ may
ﬁnd it advantageous to issue CIDs. While interviews are the primary tool available to
staﬀ at the preliminary investigation phase, in limited instances, CIDs—even CIDs
for oral testimony—are the proper tool and necessary to help staﬀ make signiﬁcant
progress toward resolving important issues (e.g., market deﬁnition, competitive
overlaps, entry, eﬃciencies, and failing ﬁrm defenses).
Id. at 38-39 (emphasis added).
128 United States Department of Justice Model Voluntary Request Letter, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1111341/download [https://perma.cc/FP9P-PAK9] (last updated
Nov. 2018) (“Submit documents analyzing, describing, or quantifying the efficiencies or synergies that
the company believes will be generated by the transaction.”). But see Guidance for Voluntary Submission of
Documents During the Initial Waiting Period, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/premerger-notification-program/hsr-resources/guidance-voluntary-submission-documents
[https://perma.cc/7UED-BHE8] (last visited May 12, 2020) (showing that the public version of the
Federal Trade Commission counterpart does not reference information about efficiencies).
129 See Malcolm Coate, The Merger Review Process at the Federal Trade Commission from
1989 to 2016 14 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955987
[https://perma.cc/QZJ5-KABN] (“[F]irms can facilitate the staﬀ review of eﬃciencies by directly
providing the appropriate cognizability documentation.”).
130 See Darren Tucker, A Survey Of Evidence Leading to Second Requests at the FTC, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 591, 602 (2012) (indicating that in studies of pre-Second Request FTC
investigations from 2008-2012, merging parties supplied detailed eﬃciencies claims in only ﬁve of
the ﬁfty-eight cases in which eﬃciencies were asserted).
131 Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Eﬃciencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 364 (2011).
132 Coate, supra note 129, at 16.
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this category, absorbing a substantial share of the enforcement agencies’ limited
investigation and litigation resources.133 In addition, over 80% of three to two
firm mergers were challenged; a majority of four to three firm mergers were
challenged; but under less than a third of five to four firm mergers were
challenged.134
In sum, relatively few proposed mergers are fully investigated. A key
methodology used to determine whether a Second Request should be issued
is whether a proposed merger would result in signiﬁcant increase of
concentration in a highly concentrated market—an analysis that uses market
concentration levels that the agencies have concluded support application of
the structural presumption of competitive harm.135
But that screen, in turn, rests on a belief that eﬃciencies are generally
present in horizontal mergers and generally large enough to meaningful.
The diﬃculty is that, as Part II demonstrates, the economics and business
literatures cast doubts on the widespread prevalence of merger-related
eﬃciencies. This calls into question the standard eﬃciency credit and
suggests that the current concentration thresholds for deﬁning problematic
mergers, as they are applied, are too high. A similar conclusion is reached by
recent work by Professors Nocke and Whinston, who suggest that under
common models of competition, “prevention of consumer harm likely
requires much more stringent thresholds than in the agencies’ current 2010
Guidelines. Indeed, with synergies of less than 5%, consumer harm occurs
Id.
Id., at 1, 27, 36 tbl.5 (2018) (“Most three-to-two and many four-to-three mergers end up as
challenged, while other transactions often pass through the review process.”); id. at 27 (“Merger
challenges are likely under either unilateral or collusion analyses for investigations with three premerger rivals, but become unlikely when ﬁve or more pre-merger rivals exist.”); see also id. at 16
(explaining that mergers to monopoly are almost always challenged and comprised 36.7% of the
challenged mergers between 1989 and 2016).
135 There is another important variable. The more narrowly that a product market is deﬁned,
the higher the market concentration impact is likely to be if the ﬁrms are in fact in the same narrow
market. For example, Coca-Cola undoubtedly has a higher market share of a hypothetical product
market of carbonated drinks than it would of a product market consisting of all beverages available
at a supermarket (including, say, bottled water, milk and coﬀee). This helps explain why antitrust
litigation so often focuses on the appropriate deﬁnition of a market. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods
Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1037-41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“In this case . . . the FTC itself made market
deﬁnition key. It claimed ‘[t]he operation of premium natural and organic supermarkets is a distinct
‘line of commerce’ within the meaning of Section 7,’ and its theory of anticompetitive eﬀect was that
the merger would ‘substantially increase concentration in the operation of [the premium natural and
organic supermarkets market].’”); id., at 1043-1049 (Tatel, J. concurring) (“I agree with the district
court that this ‘case hinges—almost entirely—on the proper deﬁnition of the relevant product
market,’ for if a separate natural and organic market exists, ‘there can be little doubt that the
acquisition of the second largest ﬁrm in the market by the largest ﬁrm in the market will tend to
harm competition in that market.’”). Had the implementation of the 2010 HMG resulted in
narrower product markets, the impact of the market-concentration measures would be expected to
capture a higher percentage of mergers. See Email from Carl Shapiro infra note 152.
133
134
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when the merging ﬁrms’ shares are much like those in the 1968 Guidelines’
thresholds.”136 Ensuring that enforcement policy protects consumers from
problematic mergers requires the agencies to re-visit their assumptions about
the existence and magnitude of eﬃciencies, and likely roll back structural
presumption thresholds for market concentration and changes in
concentration that identify the mergers are that presumed (subject to
rebuttal) to be anticompetitive.137
IV. THE FEW: INVESTIGATIONS AND LITIGATION
The failure to consider how few mergers are fully investigated and the
extent to which those that are investigated focus on highly concentrated
markets has led to erroneous criticism of the manner in which eﬃciencies are
assessed by the agencies and courts in the second class of mergers—the only
ones that the federal agencies litigate. Here we examine two speciﬁc
assertions, ﬁrst that the antitrust agencies and courts should consider “outof-market” beneﬁts even if participants in a speciﬁc market suﬀer harm that
those beneﬁts do not oﬀset; second, that merging parties are forced to bear
an “asymmetric” burden when they are put to the test of demonstrating that
eﬃciencies are cognizable.
Both theories must be understood in context. Second Request
investigations invariably focus on the mergers viewed by the antitrust
agencies as most troublesome, as shown by the outcomes of mergers subject
to these full-blown investigations.138 Over the 2007-2018 period, few mergers
subject to a Second Request investigation proceeded; of an average 48 Second
Request investigations opened each year, only nine (20%) were closed without
a litigated challenge, consent decree settling the anticompetitive concerns, or
abandonment by the parties.139 Not surprisingly, one study reports that over
136 Nocke & Whinston, supra note 58, at 2. Their analysis also suggests that the change in levels
of concentration may be a more relevant indicator of competitive harm, which may occur at delta
HHIs that are substantially smaller than the delta HHI of 200 used in the 2010 HMGs. See Kaplow,
supra note 11, at 45 n.123 (providing analysis suggesting “that an eﬃciency credit does not make sense
or, perhaps, should be set at a fairly low level”.); id. at 43 (“this credit is fairly large”).
137 Or otherwise compensate for the under-inclusiveness of the current screen applied to apply
the structural presumption. Louis Kaplow raises similar concerns about the informal use of a
standard eﬃciency credit, asking, for example, “Is there one credit for all mergers? Regardless of the
industry? The size of the merging parties?”. Kaplow, supra note 11, at 44.
138 2018 HSR REPORT, supra note 118, at 2-6 (describing the outcome of horizontal merger
investigations).
139 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007 3 [hereinafter 2007 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission challenged
twenty-two transactions . . . . [and] [t]he Antitrust Division challenged twelve merger
transactions . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008 1 [hereinafter 2008 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission
challenged 21 transactions . . . .”); id. at 7 (“[T]he Antitrust Division challenged 16 merger
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the last decade-and-a-half, FTC staﬀ support for claimed eﬃciencies in fullﬂedged investigations declined.140
One could read these results in two ways. On the one hand, the agencies’
success in blocking or modifying mergers they ﬂag for investigation may seem
high. But, of course, the cases are not randomly selected—they are chosen
precisely because the agencies believe them to carry the most serious threats
of competitive harm. Thus, given the likelihood that too generous a “standard
eﬃciency credit” has led to market concentration thresholds that are too high,
the conclusion that eﬃciencies are typically adjudged to be insuﬃcient
following an in-depth investigation is not surprising. The narrower the
aperture, the more likely it is that an overwhelming percentage of fully
investigated mergers will ultimately prove to be problematic.
Although not binding on the judiciary, courts have tended to embrace the
Agencies’ approach to eﬃciencies, despite the ongoing debate as to whether

transactions . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009 1 [hereinafter 2009 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission
challenged 19 transactions . . . .”); id. at 7 (“[T]he Antitrust Division challenged 12 merger
transactions . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010 1 [hereinafter 2010 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission
challenged 22 transactions . . . .”); id. at 2 (“The Antitrust Division challenged 19 merger
transactions.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011 2 [hereinafter 2011 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission
challenged 17 transactions . . . . [and] [t]he Antitrust Division challenged 20 merger transactions.”);
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2012 2 [hereinafter 2012 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission brought 25 merger
enforcement actions . . . . [and] the Antitrust Division challenged 19 merger transactions . . . .”);
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2013 2 [hereinafter 2013 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission brought 23 merger
enforcement actions . . . . [and] the Antitrust Division challenged 15 merger transactions.”); U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL
YEAR 2014 2 [hereinafter 2014 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission brought seventeen merger
enforcement challenges . . . . [and] the Antitrust Division challenged sixteen merger transactions.”);
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2015 2 [hereinafter 2015 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission brought 22 merger
enforcement challenges . . . . [and] the Antitrust Division challenged 20 merger transactions.”); 2016
HSR REPORT, supra note 124, at 2 (“[T]he Commission brought 22 merger enforcement
challenges . . . . [and] the Antitrust Division challenged 25 merger transactions.”); id. at app. A
(demonstrating the number of transactions receiving second requests in each year between 2007 and
2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HART–SCOTT–RODINO ANNUAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017 2 [hereinafter 2017 HSR REPORT] (“[T]he Commission brought 23
merger enforcement challenges . . . . [and] the Antitrust Division challenged 18 merger
transactions.”); 2018 HSR REPORT, supra note 118, at 2 (“[T]he Commission brought 22 merger
enforcement challenges.”); id. at 3 (“[T]he Antitrust Division challenged 17 merger transactions.”);
id. at app. A (demonstrating the number of transactions receiving second requests in each year
between 2009 and 2018).
140 Coate, supra note 129, at 24-26 (noting that the probability of eﬃciency ﬁndings declined).
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federal law recognizes an eﬃciency defense.141 Thus, for example, federal
courts have required merging parties to demonstrate veriﬁable eﬃciencies
that are merger-speciﬁc and that will beneﬁt consumers.142 The Department
of Justice has insisted that the examination of claimed eﬃciencies by courts
be rigorous.143 “The trend among lower courts has thus been to recognize or
at least assume that evidence of eﬃciencies may rebut the presumption that
a merger’s eﬀects will be anticompetitive, even if such evidence could not be
used as a defense to an actually anticompetitive merger.”144
Despite this consideration, the operation of the current eﬃciencies
standard has been criticized. The legal system has been characterized as
unsympathetic to an eﬃciencies defense, and some have argued that the test
for assessing eﬃciencies must be defective in some respect given that no
merging parties have been able to sustain that defense in litigation.145 This
premise is not strictly true: the 2020 district court decision in New York v.
Deutsche Telekom held that a horizontal merger between Sprint and T-Mobile
did not violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act despite the presence of the
structural presumption, by relying in part on eﬃciencies that the court found
to be cognizable.146 Recognition of eﬃciencies also played a role, albeit a
141 See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Despite,
however, widespread acceptance of the potential beneﬁt of eﬃciencies as an economic matter . . . it
is not at all clear that they oﬀer a viable legal defense to illegality under Section 7.”).
142 See St. Alphonsus Med. Center-Nampa Inc., v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775,
790-91 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The defendant must also demonstrate that the claimed eﬃciencies are
merger-speciﬁc, which is to say that the eﬃciencies cannot readily be achieved without the
concomitant loss of a competitor.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also FTC
v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2001) 721-22 (ﬁnding that the district court’s inquiry into the
veriﬁable eﬃciencies was insuﬃcient because “the district court failed to make the kind of factual
determinations necessary to render the appellees’ eﬃciency defense suﬃciently concrete”); FTC v.
Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[A] defendant may rebut the government’s
prima facie case with evidence showing that the intended merger would create signiﬁcant eﬃciencies
in the relevant market.”).
143 See, e.g., Proposed Conclusions of Law of the United States at 44, United States v. AT&T,
Inc. (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:17-cv-02511-RJL) 2017 WL 6329012, https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/ﬁle/1061066/download [https://perma.cc/88KE-ZUES] (“To the extent the Court
entertains Defendants’ eﬃciencies defense, the Court ‘must undertake a rigorous analysis’ of the
claimed eﬃciencies. . . . The requirements for a successful eﬃciencies defense are [very]
rigorous . . . .”) (internal citation omitted).
144 New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-05434-VM-RWL, slip op. at 57 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 10, 2020).
145 E.g., Crane, supra note 131 (noting the asymmetrical imbalance between the lower threshold
of proving potential harms and the greater hurdles of showing oﬀsetting eﬃciencies); Erin L.
Shencopp & Nathaniel J. Harris, Using Eﬃciencies To Defend Mergers: The Current Legal Landscape,
THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2019, at 2 (claiming that no case to date has held asserted
eﬃciencies were suﬃcient to overcome establish anticompetitive eﬀects of a merger).
146 See Deutsche Telekom, slip op. at 83 (“[T]he Court concludes that Defendants’ proposed
efficiencies are cognizable . . . .”). The court was careful to note that the cognizable efficiencies “do not
alone possess dispositive weight in this inquiry.” Id. In particular, the court separately placed weight on
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smaller one, in the only other case in which the government lost a merger
challenge after establishing the structural presumption.147
Before considering the content of two more speciﬁc criticisms—the “outof-market” and “asymmetry” arguments—it is worth understanding their
pedigree. As we have seen, two fundamental views of eﬃciencies arose in the
Williamson-Bork formulations. First, both Williamson and Bork argued for
a total welfare approach, which meant that consumers could be subject to
higher prices so long as someone else garners beneﬁts greater than the loss
suﬀered by those consumers in the harmed market; an approach that could
justify harm to competition in an identiﬁable market.148 In the original
formulation, indeed in the Williamson graph reproduced in Part I above, that
“someone” could be the newly-merged ﬁrm itself, in circumstances in which
its post-merger increase in proﬁts exceeded the total of higher prices paid by
its customers. Second, Bork (but not Williamson) eschewed any attempt to
calculate eﬃciencies individually; he preferred a relaxed, structural approach
that would permit most horizontal mergers to proceed. The “out-of-market”
and “asymmetry” contentions reﬂect considerations found in each of these
early views. We now examine each in turn.
A. “Out-of-Market” Eﬃciencies
One way to understand the total welfare approach is to recognize that, in
essence, it justiﬁes approval of mergers that harm consumers in an identiﬁed
market as long as a greater amount of beneﬁt appears elsewhere in the system.
That argument was rejected by the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in
Philadelphia National Bank. The Court held that merging parties cannot
justify harm to one set of customers by showing that a merger beneﬁts a
diﬀerent set of customers (in that case consumer borrowers versus
commercial borrowers).149 This approach—focusing on eﬃciency beneﬁts in
the markets that may otherwise suﬀer harm—is employed by the agencies
“Sprint’s decreasing competitive relevance,” id., at 84, and on remedies that would, for example, work
“to establish DISH as a fourth nationwide [carrier] and replacement for Sprint.” Id. at 106.
147 See FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 151 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating that the
structural presumption was overcome because the court focused on a review of market conditions
but did not place weight on the parties’ eﬃciencies defense); id. at 153 (recognizing the existence of
some cognizable eﬃciencies, but not enough to “defeat the plaintiﬀs’ claim of anticompetitive
eﬀects”—they simply provided “some limited additional evidence” to rebut the FTC’s claim of
anticompetitive harm); see also United States v. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (holding that
market concentration measures were not determinative in light of other market characteristics).
148 Salop, supra note 72, at 350-53 (describing ineﬃciencies created by the aggregate welfare
standard).
149 See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (“[A] merger the eﬀect of
which ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning
of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneﬁcial.”).
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today. The 2010 HMG explain that “the Agencies consider whether
cognizable eﬃciencies likely would be suﬃcient to reverse the merger’s
potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price
increases in that market.”150 Thus, the Department of Justice recently
emphasized that competitive beneﬁts “must also ‘pass[]through to consumers,
rather than simply bolstering [the defendant’s] proﬁt margin.’”151
Some commentators argue that harm to consumers in one market should
be balanced against beneﬁts to consumers in some other markets. This
argument has been advanced by current FTC Commissioner Wilson. She
argues that product markets are being deﬁned too narrowly; a trend she
believes increases the importance of recognizing out-of-market eﬃciencies.152
Former Commissioner Wright writes bluntly: “[r]ejection of out-of-market
eﬃciencies is an obsolete approach . . . that was born out of an era in which
eﬃciencies justiﬁcations in merger cases generally were viewed with
considerable skepticism.”153
This resembles the total welfare approach in the following sense: harm to
participants in a properly-deﬁned market is justiﬁed by a ﬁnding that
participants in another market will beneﬁt. In fact, there are economic and
jurisprudential reasons to ensure that horizontal mergers do not leave
deﬁnable classes of market participants harmed.154
To begin, the empirical economic evidence does not lend support to any
current claim for increased permissiveness of enforcement. Nor is there any
basis to believe that eﬃciencies should be treated generously on the ground
2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 30-31.
Proposed Conclusions of Law of the United States, supra note 143, at 48 (quoting United
States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
152 See Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Unintended Consequences
of Narrower Product Markets and the Overly Leveraged Nature of Philadelphia National Bank: Remarks
as Prepared for Delivery at the Antitrust Enforcement Symposium 2019 4, 13, 17 (2019)
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1532894/wilson_-_remarks_at_oxford_
antitrust_enforcement_symposium_6-30-19_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZM8-WST3] (describing the
issue of product markets and out-of-market efficiencies in more detail). But cf. Email from Carl Shapiro,
Professor, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley, to Nancy Rose and Jonathan Sallet, (Mar. 17, 2020) (“[T]he way to
strengthen merger enforcement is to reinvigorate the structural presumption while explaining that
narrow markets often are appropriate. The HHI levels in the 2010 HMG would be strong enough, in
my view, if markets are defined narrowly, as implied by the HMT.”).
153 Jan Rybnicek & Joshua Wright, Outside In or Inside Out?: Counting Merger Eﬃciencies
Inside and Out of the Relevant Market 1, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2411270 [https://perma.cc/QG58-RDUW]. The invocation of two-sided markets, as adopted
unfortunately for transactions markets in Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018), has a
similar quality: harm to merchants and to consumers that do not use American Express cards was
balanced against beneﬁts to American Express cardholders.
154 Bork himself seems to suggest that balancing consumer harm versus benefit to the firm is beyond
the ambit of the courts, although the example he gives assumes a world in which there is “no danger of a
monopoly profit” and therefore may reflect his view that extra-economic considerations are for legislatures
to consider. See Bork, supra note 13, at 80 (“Striking the balance is essentially a legislative task.”).
150
151
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that markets will self-correct155 and that, therefore, it is better to permit than
disallow a proposed merger.
The inclusion of out-of-market eﬀects threatens to over-complicate
economic analysis. Imagine a world in which two companies A and B supply
Product X to a few customers and Products Y and Z to a larger, separate class
of customers. Were the two companies to merge, they would have a monopoly
in the manufacture of Product X but they claim eﬃciencies that would deliver
slightly lower prices in the more competitive markets that sell to the
customers of Products Y and Z. They assert that the sum of the lower prices
spread among the customers of Products Y and Z is greater than the sum of
the high prices to the customers of Product X.
To analyze that claim would reasonably require an analysis of the general
equilibrium eﬀects of the merger; an “unrealistic if not impossible” task.156
And it is a task with signiﬁcant distributional implications as some groups
lose and others win; indeed Williamson himself highlighted the complexity
of assessing redistributional eﬀects as one of the major qualiﬁcations to the
total welfare approach to eﬃciency analysis.157 Moreover, harm stays put:
There is no mechanism to require those who beneﬁt to compensate those who
are harmed.158
155 See Jonathan Baker, Jonathan Sallet & Fiona Scott Morton, Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement,
127 YALE L.J. 1916, 1919 (2018) (calling upon antitrust enforcers to recognize how underenforcement
might not be corrected).
156 JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY 191-92 (2019) (“[O]nce the analysis extends beyond the market in which harm is alleged, there
may be no principled stopping point short of undertaking what is unrealistic if not impossible: a general
equilibrium analysis of harms and benefits throughout the entire economy.”). The general equilibrium
effects refer to tracing the direct and indirect effects of a merger throughout all parts of the economy.
157 Williamson wrote that

[i]nasmuch as the income redistribution which occurs is usually large relative to the
size of the dead-weight loss, attaching even a slight weight to income distribution
eﬀects can sometimes inﬂuence the overall valuation signiﬁcantly. . . . [T]he transfer
involved could be regarded unfavorably not merely because it redistributes income in
an undesirable way . . . but also because it produces social discontent. This latter has
serious eﬃciency implications that the above analysis does not take explicitly into
account. . . . Distinguishing social from private costs in this respect may, however, be
the most fundamental reason for treating claims of private eﬃciency gains skeptically.
Williamson, supra note 33, at 28. Jonathan Baker similarly relies upon the importance of maintaining
continuing public support for antitrust in his analysis, as a matter of political economy. BAKER, supra
note 156, at 192 (“It is hard to tell consumers, farmers, workers, and suppliers . . . that they must
experience competitive harms in order to permit large ﬁrms to lower costs or to allow buyers
purchasing in other markets to pay less, without leading those victims of market power to question
the beneﬁt of the political bargain.”).
158 See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 369, 370 (2016)
(“‘Balancing’ requires values that can be cardinally measured and weighed against each other. The
factors that are supposedly balanced in Sherman Act cases almost never ﬁt this description.”).
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Recall that cross-market eﬀects would only come into play if and when a
complete analysis demonstrates that, even with consideration of eﬃciencies,
the impact of the merger “may be substantially to lessen competition.”159 The
likely impact of an “out-of-market” test would thus be to tremendously
complicate antitrust enforcement by requiring agencies that have already
proven harm in one market to take on a full analysis of other markets. Indeed,
courts would not only need to assess the individual outcomes of each market
but they would need to assess the causation between outcomes in diﬀerent
markets; as the 2010 HMG explain, “a proﬀered eﬃciency cannot arise from
anticompetitive eﬀects.”160
Such an extra burden where harm has been proven is particularly
troublesome given the likelihood that merger enforcement is already “under
deterrent.”161 Thus, concerns about administrability of an “out-of-market”
standard counsel against the introduction of cross-market eﬀects.162
A central tenet of antitrust law has been that the law does not
accommodate and the courts will not countenance any attempt to say that
harming competition is justiﬁed by other outcomes.163 Competition “cannot
159 Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes mergers the eﬀect of which “may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
160 United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Millet, J., concurring).
161 Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 705; see also supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
162 See BAKER, supra note 156, at 191 (“The judicial prohibition against cross-market welfare tradeoffs has an obvious administrability justification: the prohibition reduces the complexity of the
reasonableness evaluation under review.”); Daniel Crane, Balancing Effects Across Markets, 80 ANTITRUST
L.J. 397, 409-10 (2015) (“The most convincing justification for a market-specificity rule is that balancing
pro- and anticompetitive effects across market boundaries unduly increases the complexity of antitrust
decision making.”). Both Professor Baker and Professor Crane would be open to the calculation of crossmarket effects in certain circumstances; for example, Professor Baker believes that

a court should allow a cross-market welfare trade-oﬀ when it is evident from a
qualitative comparison that the harm to competition in one market is small while the
beneﬁt to competition in another market is vastly greater and there is no practical way
to obtain the beneﬁt without accepting the harm.
BAKER, supra note 156, at 192-93. Professor Crane favors “placing on the merging parties the burden
of proving that the balancing factors allowing the merger” but not making it a part of the
government’s prima facie case. Crane, supra, at 410. We prefer the reliance on prosecutorial
discretion embodied in note 14 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the fashioning of
appropriate remedies, such a divestiture in markets where harm would occur in order to permit
beneﬁts to accrue in other markets. Such an approach to remedies was taken, for example, in the
DOJ approval of the Dow-Dupont merger in 2017. See generally Competitive Impact Statement,
United States v. Dow Chemical Company, No. 1:17-cv-01176, 2017 WL 7118164 (D.D.C. June 15, 2017).
163 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-94 (1978) (rejecting the
asserted defense that minimum prices are a way to guarantee safety of construction and the court’s
response); see also United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972) (“If a decision is to be made
to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy for greater competition in another portion this
. . . is a decision that must be made by Congress and not by private forces or the courts.”); Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1979) (“[A] conclusion that excessive competition
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be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain
private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater
competition in a more important sector of the economy.”164
B. Asymmetry of Burdens
The “asymmetry” approach contends that an improperly high burden is
placed on merging parties to rebut the government’s showing of harm. We
understand this approach to argue, in essence, that too much is demanded of
merging parties, given the generalized likelihood that eﬃciencies will
occur.165 Thus, Professor Crane asserts an “asymmetry” in the burden placed
on the government to prove its prima facie case and the burden placed upon
defendants to rebut it.166 Commissioner Wilson notes precedent from
multiple federal courts of appeals that in highly concentrated markets, “the
magnitude of those eﬃciencies that remain in the relevant market must
substantially exceed the magnitude of harms.”167
But the burden of production requirement ﬂows logically from the fact
that it is the merging parties that have the information and incentive to
demonstrate eﬃciencies. Once a prima facie case is established (typically but
not necessarily through the structural presumption), the burden of proof
appropriately falls on the merging parties. Williamson was resolute in
dismissing anything less than this:
[I]f eﬃciencies are to be a defense at all, it is clear that the companies which
are, presumably, sensitive to the relevant economies in proposing the merger

would cause one side of the market more harm than good may justify a legislative exemption from the
antitrust laws, but does not constitute a defense to a violation of the Sherman Act.”).
164 Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 610; see, e.g., United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 298 (2d Cir.
2015) (“[T]he dissent’s theory—that the presence of a strong competitor justifies a horizontal price-fixing
conspiracy—endorses a concept of marketplace vigilantism that is wholly foreign to the antitrust laws.”).
165 Professor Wright labels his “out-of-market” view in terms of asymmetry as well. See
Rybnicek & Wright, supra note 153, at 5.
166 Crane, supra note 131, at 347-49. Under established precedent, the government can establish a
prima facie case by satisfying the structural presumption. If that is done, then the merging parties must
produce evidence to show that other factors, which can include efficiency, negate the threat of
anticompetitive harm. If that occurs, then the government has the opportunity to produce additional
evidence to support its claim. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (“The basic outline of a section 7 horizontal acquisition case is familiar. By showing that a
transaction will lead to undue concentration in the market for a particular product in a particular
geographic area, the government establishes a presumption that the transaction will substantially lessen
competition. . . . The burden of producing evidence to rebut this presumption then shifts to the
defendant. . . . If the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption, the burden of producing additional
evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of
persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
167 Wilson, supra note 152, at 14.
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in the ﬁrst place, must be prepared to make the case for them in court. They
have the data and these must be supplied.168

As the 2010 HMG explain, “[e]ﬃciencies are diﬃcult to verify and
quantify, in part because much of the information relating to eﬃciencies is
uniquely in the possession of the merging ﬁrms.”169 Moreover, the ability to
achieve eﬃciencies depends on execution by the new ﬁrm and “eﬃciencies
projected reasonably and in good faith by the merging ﬁrms may not be
realized.”170 Professor Hovenkamp explains that “evidence of eﬃciencies
typically relates to a ﬁrm’s own internal production and processes. . . . [F]irms
almost always know more about their own internal processes and the costs of
changing them than any outside, including the merger enforcement
Agencies.”171
Indeed, the burden of showing eﬃciencies grows with increased threat of
harm.172 Given that the merger cases being brought by the antitrust agencies
against horizontal mergers focus precisely on the cases that present the
strongest showing of harm,173 the current requirements placed on merging
parties are necessary to ensure that the historic, overly generous view of
eﬃciencies does not override well-grounded predictions of competitive harm.
CONCLUSION
Conventional analysis of the treatment of eﬃciency claims has paid too
little attention to the fact that the overwhelming majority of horizontal
mergers that are not fully-investigated and has failed to recognize that the
small number that are subject to Second Requests are precisely those in which
the risk of harm is likely to be the greatest.
The economic literature demonstrates that efficiencies are neither as
ubiquitous nor as uniformly large as the notion of a standard efficiency credit
suggests. This provides reason to suspect that market concentration thresholds
as they are applied are too lax. Given the challenge of reviewing efficiencies
Williamson, supra note 33, at 24.
2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 30.
Id.
Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 725-26.
See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (ﬁnding that a premerger HHI score indicating “a highly concentrated industry” combined with a projected 510 point
increase in the HHI score after the merger created “by a wide margin, a presumption that the merger
will lessen competition”); see also 2010 HMG, supra note 1, at 31 (“When the potential adverse
competitive eﬀect of a merger is likely to be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable
eﬃciencies would be necessary to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive. In adhering to
this approach, the Agencies are mindful that the antitrust laws give competition, not internal
operational eﬃciency, primacy in protecting customers.”).
173 See supra note 103.
168
169
170
171
172
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without a full-fledged investigation, it is not realistic to imagine that
significantly more could be done to analyze merger-specific efficiencies short
of a Second Request. This suggests that market concentration thresholds
should be re-examined and, very probably, lowered. Because we believe that
the total welfare analysis is incorrect and that customers in properly defined
markets should not suffer harm merely because others benefit, proposals to
consider “out-of-market” benefits should be similarly rejected.
Additionally, we do not believe too much is asked of merging parties when
they must rebut the government’s prima facie case. First, the merging ﬁrms
are the entities with the knowledge and data required to calibrate plausible
merger-speciﬁc eﬃciencies. Of even greater import, if the eﬀect of the
market concentration standards is to identify mergers that are particularly
problematic (because only those are being investigated and challenged), then
the criticism of the way agencies and courts approach eﬃciencies is
misplaced. If only the most threatening mergers are being subject to review,
these are the mergers where the burden of demonstrating eﬃciencies should
be the most rigorous.
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Number of Transactions Reported under the Hart–Scott–Rodino
Act and Removed After Early Termination Screening, by Year174

Year

Total
Adjusted
Transactions

Requested
Early
Termination
of Review

Request for
Early
Termination
Granted

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

2,108
1,656
684
1,128
1,414
1,400
1,286
1,618
1,754
1,772
1,992

1,840
1,385
575
953
1,157
1,094
990
1,274
1,366
1,374
1,552

1,402
1,021
396
704
888
902
797
1,020
1,086
1,102
1,220

2018

2,028

1,500

AVERAGE

1,570

1,255

174

app. A.

Remaining
Transactions
Eligible for a
Second
Request
706

Remaining
as % of
Eligible
Transactions

635
288
424
526
498
489
598
668
670
772

33.5%
38.3%
42.1%
37.6%
37.2%
35.6%
38.0%
37.0%
38.1%
37.8%
38.8%

1,170

858

42.3%

976

594

38.0%

2016 HSR REPORT, supra note 124, at app. A, and 2018 HSR REPORT, supra note 118, at
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Table A2: Number of Transactions Receiving Second Requests as Portion
of Total Transactions, by Year175

Year

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
AVERAGE

175

app. A.

Eligible
for a
Second
Request

After Early
Termination
Review,
Remaining
Transactions

Investigations
in Which
Second
Requests
Were Issued

% of Eligible
Transactions
Reviewed

2,108
1,656
684
1,128
1,414
1,400
1,286
1,618
1,754
1,772
1,992
2,028
1,570

706
635
288
424
526
498
489
598
668
670
772
858
594

63
41
31
42
55
49
47
51
47
54
51
45
48

3.0%
2.5%
4.5%
3.7%
3.9%
3.5%
3.7%
3.2%
2.7%
3.0%
2.6%
2.2%
3.2%

After Early
Termination
Review, % of
Remaining
Transactions
Reviewed
8.9%

6.5%
10.8%
9.9%
10.5%
9.8%
9.6%
8.5%
7.0%
8.1%
6.6%
5.2%
8.5%

2016 HSR REPORT, supra note 124, at app. A, and 2018 HSR REPORT, supra note 118, at

